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CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM MD DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED
The chief object of philosophical inquiry since the
beginning of the history of philosophy has been the under-
standing of the ultimate reality of the universe. This
search for ultimate truth has led to the questioning of
the nature of human experience, the nature of human knowledge,
the nature of the universe, and the ultimate values of life.
These questions have led to the development of three fields
of study in philosophy: metaphysics, epi stemology , and ethics
or axiology. The question as to the reality and nature of
God is not confined to ajiyone of these fields. All three
fields are involved in any sj'^stematically consistent endeavor
to understand the whole truth,
I. THE PROBLEM
Statement of the problem . The purpose of this thesis
is to expound and criticise Professor Pratt's (1) corre-
spondence theory of truth as it involves the basis for the
idea of God, (2) his epistemology and metaphysics as a
background, and (3) his conception of the nature of God, its
theoretical, practical, and ethical implications; and to
propound the unsolved problems of Professor Pratt's hypothesis
offering possible alternative solutions.

2Brief analysis of the problem . The problem of the
criteria of truth arises as a necessary basis for all
philosophy. Professor Pratt believes that truth can be
found in experience. This is the correspondence theory
of truth. It holds that a thing is true when the judgment
corresponds v/ith the object. It all sounds sensible at
first, but the problem arises v/hen it is discovered that
there is no verification of this correspondence of the judgment
with the object. The correspondence theory lacks verification.
Another theory of truth which is really a criterion
of truth is coherence. Professor Pratt accepts coherence
as a test for truth, but when dealing with the existential
world he turns to the correspondence theory saying that the
test of coherence does not apply to judgments concerning
the existential world. By the coherence theory it is
maintained that the ultimate criterion for truth is systematic
consistency. Coherence is a theory which includes other
theories such as pragmatism and rationalism. It takes into
account all of experience and tries to explain it in a
rationally systematic and consistent way. Professor Pratt
does not accept the whole coherence theory, but accepts only
coherence as a test of truth other than that regarding the
existential world. The problem is to find coherent
verification for the correspondence theory, or rejecting it,
to find a better criterion of truth.

3The next problem to arise is the problem of knov/ledge.
This epistemological problem has been a starting point for
most philosophies ever since Descartes first opened up the
question of the possibility of the non-existence of certain
qualities which are perceived. The problem briefly is a
question as to whether the object of perception and the real
object are alike or different. Does experience reveal
reality?
The metaphysical problem is a problem as to the
ultimate reality of the universe. Is matter real and the
only reality, or is mind real and the only reality, or are
both mind and matter ultimately real and independently real?
Professor Pratt is both an epistemological dualist and a
metaphysical dualist. He believes that knowledge is indirect,
and that both mind and matter are independently real. If
mind and matter are both real, how can one influence the other
or vice versa? How did matter originate? V^Tiat is matter?
Professor Pratt goes to much pain to refute
materialistic naturalism, yet his conception of God is so
inclined to melee God's values so far from man that in the
end one wonders if such a conception is any more fruitful
to man than materialism itself. Hov/ever, there are some
characteristics attributed to God which seem to meet with
reality much rrore coherently than does materialism.
i
4These ethical implications of such a God as Professor
Pratt describes are a problem. If God' s values are beyond
man's appreciation, and if God is not interested in man, then
man's values must be of no eternal significance. Again, a
God who acts entirely spontaneously making all of his purposes
immediately efficient seems to be the kind of a God that has
no permanent values, but who acts just about as he feels like
it. Is such a God an ethical God? Professor Pratt seems to
sacrifice the goodness of God in order to make him all pov^erful
and yet allow for the evil in the world.
II. DEFINITIONS OF TERi^IS USED
Many of the terms that will be used in this thesis are
terms which will have to be defined as they are used, for they
are part of the hypothesis. Many other terms are tems that
are commonly'- used by philosophers and which in jnany cases will
need no definition. The follov/ing terms defined are terms
which either having been used by Professor Pratt are more
easilj?- defined here, or v/hich are terms which have been
applied to Professor Pratt's hypothesis.
Existent . The term refers to that v^hich is physically
real. Qualities which may be perceived are not necessarily
physical realities. Existents are those things which are
independently and physically real, which are metaphysically
real.

5Essence. The term refers to that which is not
physically real as an existent but that which has real
qualities in the realm of experience. An essence exists
only in the conceptual world.
The correspondence theor^r of truth. This is the
theorj'^ of truth which states that truth is the correspondence
of a judgment with its object. It will be defined more in
detail in the following chapter.
Coherence. The term means systematic consistency. To
be coherent one must conform to the lav/s of contradiction and
identity. "Any judgment is true, if it is both self-consistent
and coherently connected with our system of judgments as a
whole."!
Coherence m.ay be used as a test for truth without the
acceptance of the whole theory'- of coherence which implies a
synoptic vievj^ of all the criteria of truth. As a test for
truth it means that the truth must be consistent with itself.
The whole theory implies a systematic consistency of the whole
realm of knowledge.
Trans cej^idental values . Though Professor Pratt does not
use this terminology, it is used in this thesis in referring
to his conception of God as having values which are beyond the
1 Brightman, ITP, 59-61. Explanation of this and
subsequent abbreviations is to be found in the bibliography.

6ability of man to understand or appreciate. It likerwise in
part refers to the very similar, if not the same, conception
of God as being disinterested in hiiman welfare.
Ill, ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
The remainder of the thesis follows in the order which
seems to fit best the progress of thought, starting first with
the theory of truth, progressing on to the establishment of
the epistemological and metaphysical hypotheses, upon which
the idea of God is built.
Chapter II is the exposition and the criticism of the
correspondence theorj?^ of truth. It challenges the theory as
having no method of verification, and offers coherence as
a method of verifying that which corresponds in experience.
Chapter III is the exposition of the epistemological
and metaphysical dualism and the criticisms of each. Special
consideration is given to the nature and reality of mental
content. The efficiency of purpose through the mind-body
relationship, making purpose causal is likewise discussed
and criticised.
Chapter IV deals with the main hypothesis considered
in this thesis: "Spiritual Pantheism". Other hypotheses are
refuted and Professor Pratt's conception expovmded and
criticised. The pantheistic world soul, the finite self,
their relationships to the world and their purposes are discussed.
I
7Chapter V summarizes and concludes the problems.
The problems are divided into three different groups:
the problems implied, the problems unsolved, and the problems
solved. It also includes suggestions for alternative
solutions.
The thesis is concluded with a summary and a classified
bibliography.
II
CHAPTER II
THE CORRESPONDENCE THEORY OF TRUTH
There are two opposing theories of truth: rationalism
and empiricism. Briefly, rationalism is the belief that only
through reason can truth be found. Certain truths must be
accepted a priori and all other truth deduced from these,
thus building a coherent system of thought. Empiricism on
the opposite extreme holds that only through experience can
truth be found. These two theories of truth do not always
oppose each other. Some philosophers are quite rationalistic
and yet they are also empirical. They accept the laws of
reason, and may develop quite a rationalistic system which
exx^lains the facts of experience. However, the rationalist
is more apt to interpret his experience in a rational manner,
while the empiricist is more apt to formulate all of his
conceptions by comparing one experience with the sum total
of experiences.
Professor Pratt is an empiricist. Yet he also at times
employs a form of rationalism. "It is the task of thought
to put together the facts which experience provides, under
the guidance of laws of logic, so as to t^in a more nearly
complete and self-consi stent conception of the real world
in which our destinies are cast."^ This and other statements
1 Pratt, PR, 2.

9shcfw hew rationalism at times enters into his thinking.
But the correspondence theory of truth is a basic
principle in his whole philosophy. This theory denounces
rationalism as a means of finding existential truth, and
proclaims that only through experience can the truth of the
existential world be found. However, coherence is accepted
as a good method to be employed in finding the essence of
reality. The existential v^orld can be proAred by the
correspondence of a judgment with its object. But the
conceptual world can be proved by its coherence.
Professor Pratt establishes the correspondence theory
of truth before establishing his dualistic realism; but the
two are verj^ closely related and are interdependent. The
realistic hypothesis suggests the correspondence theory
of truth and in turn is dependent upon it. Though Professor
Pratt does not acknowledge it, the correspondence theory of
truth presupposes an objective independent realit;!^/- of
physical things. "The correspondence theorj?^ defines truth
as the correspondence of a judgment with its object. "2
Before a judgment can correspond with its object, the
object must be real if the truth is to be considered as
ultim.ate. Professor Pratt admits that self-consistency
and coherence are verifications of conceptual truth, but
Pratt, PR, 75.
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denies that existential truth must be verified before
it can be considered as truth. He says that existential
truth can be experienced as being independently true without
verification.
Now one of the most important considerations in
proving the truth of a judgment is its self-consistency
and its coherence with the mass of our recognized and
established truths. Coherence is recognized by the
upholders of the correspondence theorj/- as an important,
perhaps the most important, test of truth. But the
test of a thing is not the thing tested. The proof of
the pudding is the eating; but the eating presupposes
the pv^ding. Coherence is a way of telling a true
judgment, a necessary condition which a judgment must
fulfill before vre can be sure that it is true; but v/hen
we are dealing with the existential world coherence is
not what we mean by the truth of the judgment.
^
The correspondence theoi'j' of tx*utli is not the test
of truth, it is only a definition of truth. ^ A true judgment
is one that corresponds to reality. But how can one compare
a judgment with reality? Once can not compare a judgment
with reality for reality-' is not accessible. One can only
compere a judgment with one's experience of reality. As to
the real nature of the object which one experiences, it can
not be known except through a rational interpretation of the
experience. It is not possible to compare ideas, which are
a part of experience, with any reality which is not a part of
experience. Man cm not go beyond the realm, of experience to
obtain an object to see if it corresponds Avith the judgment
3 Pratt, PR, 78.
4 Brightman, I TP, 35 and 49-50.
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of it in experience. Only ideas within the realm of experience
can be compared. In this latter sense of the correspondence of
ideas then perhaps it could be said that one idea corresponds
to another, but it cannot be said that an idea corresponds to
reality beyond the realm of experience.
Our judgment of reality should correspond vj-ith reality,
but this can only be knovm by verifying the trtxth about reality
by using the criterion of coherence. The correspondence theory
of truth lacks verification. Before a judgment of anything can
be considered true it nust be shown to be coherent, self-
consistent, and consistent with all the known facts of
experience.
The personal idealist will accept the correspondence
theory of truth as a description of truth; but to be proved
as truth the correspondence of the judgment with its object
must be verified. The personal idealist objects to the
acceptance of the independent reality of physical objects
unless it can be coherently verified. Thus far a coherent
verification of the realistic hypothesis seems to have been
impossible.
The realists seem to fear that the personal idealist
will deny the truth of scientific data. The personal idealist
does not deny scientific truth, but recognizes it as being
phenomenally true rather the.n being metaphysically true.
Science observes and records the sequence of physical events.
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but it does not explain the underlying cause of it all.
This is beyond the field of science and should not be a
question for the scientist to try to solve. It is a question
for the philosopher to explore. The nature of such questions
lies beyond the realm of physical observation.
^
The correspondence theory of truth can not be accepted
as anything more than a description of truth. It does not
verify truth. The correspondence of a judgment with its
object may be proved to be true or imtrue. This can only be
determined by verification. Ultimately all truth must be
verified by its coherence. Coherence may be more than just
the test of truth; it may be synoptic in character including
all the tests of truth. "Coherence means systematic
consistency, . . ."^
The coherence criterion looks beyond the mere
self-consistency of propositions to a comprehensive,
synoptic view of all experience, . , . Any judgment
is true, if it is both self-consistent and coherently
connected with our system of judgments as a vmole.'^
The correspondence theorj' of truth only describes the
truth which m^ust ultimately be verif :i ed by its self-consistency
and coherence before it can be accepted as true. Though it can
not be accepted, dualistic realism remains to be discussed.
5 Bovme, Fersonalism , 274-275,
6 Brightmeji, I TP, 59.
"7 Brightman, I TP, 61,

CHAPTER III
THE REALISTIC HYPOTHESIS OF J. B. PRATT
This chapter might well be divided into three
chapters; but in as much as the main part of this thesis is
Professor Pratt's conception of God, these three main points
serve as a basis for that conception and are rightly part
of the whole realistic hypothesis. The first sectioh will
be a consideration of the epistemological dualism of Professor
Pratt. The second section will deal with his metaphysical
dualism. And the third section will be a discussion of the
mind-body problem as presented by Professor Pratt.
I. EPISTEMOLOGICAL DUALISM
The first attempt at realistic epistemology was made
by Locke in the Seventeenth Century. In his attem.pt he made
a sharp division between one's mental content and ever^'^thing
else. This implied theoretically that it would be impossible
to have any object save our own ideas. The skeptical outcome
of this attempt at dualistic epistemology led to the avoiding
of the problems of such a dualism by attempting to establish
a realistic hypothesis without dualism. But, Professor Pratt
says, these attempts to get along without dualism have involved
as mexiy difficulties as Locke's. Idealistic thinkers are
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satisfied to say that a realistic epistemology is unstable,
but Professor Pratt believes that this is unnecessary and
not the truth, 1 It should be recognized, however^ that not
all idealists would agree that a realistic epistemology is
unstable even though they might agree that the realist's
metaphysics is unsound.
Rather than discard all possibilities of realism
Professor Pratt believes that it is possible to remove these
objectionable aspects found in both Locke's Dualism and in
the New Realism, This he proposes to do by taking the sound
elements from both.
The chief weakness of Locke's epistemology was his
refusal to allovf for any object other than one's own mental
content. New Realism attempted to get around this difficulty
by saying that the mind could directly intuit physical things
Professor Pratt vmuld modify this attempt of New Realism by
refusing to admit that one can directly intuit physical thing
or exi stents, but saying that one could refer to them, or
conceive of them.. Yet one can also refer to, or conceive of
objects containing particular combinations of qualities which
would not necessarily have ejiy existential status whatsoever,
but would be purely objects in the field of essence. Such
objects would not be existential objects, but only objects
in the sense that they are the things referred to by the
1 Pratt, PR, 190.
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subject. Mental content then would not be synonymous with
the mind or the subject, but vfould be an essence wBiich was
neither the epistemological subject nor the ontological
object, but the epistemological object, a separate entity. The
epistemological object may be referred to as mental content.
It may correspond to the ontological object in the perceiving
of an existent, or it may be just an essence which has no
existential reality. If the mind can refer to mental content
which has no ontological objectivity, then it may also
attribute to ontolo-^ical objects qualities which are directly
intended, or which were not necessarily intended. Professor
Pratt would say that these qualities are directly intended.
ViThile it is true that we cannot directly intuit
physical things and other exi stents outside our own
mental content, can we not refer to them, or conceive
them, thus m.aking them our objects or referends; and
can v/e not, at the same time, conceive particular
combinations of qualities which have a logical rather
than an existential status? If the mind can do these
things (and it seems to me experience shows that it
can), it plainly is able also to attribute to the
conceived but not intuited existents the qualities
thus directly intended. To put it in briefer and
more technical terms, I can see no reason to doubt that
the mind can have an epistemological object and conceive
it as characterizing an existent or ontological object.
^
It seems very possible that if the mind has the power
to conceive of non-existent objects, it might also have the
power to conceive of existents with qualities directly intended.
But how do vie know that these qualities of existents are
2 Pratt, PR, 191.
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directly intended? If they are directly intended, who
intended that they should be just as they were conceived to
be? Is it not equally possible that those so called intended
qualities might be quite different from the qualities
experienced? Is it not equally possible that if the mind
has the power to conceive of qualities where there is no
existent object involved, that it irdght also conceive of qualitie
attributed to an existent which were not necessarily intended,
but which were attributed because of the nature of the human
perception?
This claim that the mind can conceive of the qualities
attributed to exi stents as they are intended, is a claim which
must be put in the realm of possibilities, but which along v^ith
many other elements in the realistic hypothesis cannot be
verified. That the existential world exists just as we conceive
it, is really more of an expression of faith or a wish than a
self-consistent and coherent statement of reality. This must
be taken as an a priori along with the correspondence theory
of truth ajid the general realistic hypothesis all of which are
more or less interdependent on this same a priori acceptance
of the reality of the existential world.
Although it is not agreed that one's mental content
characterizes existential objects, the main hypothesis of
epistemological dualism is not based primarily upon this
realistic interpretation of it. Epistemological dualism may
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be accepted as readily by the idealist as by the realist.^
Epistemological dualism is the hypothesis that in the process
of knowing the existential world there are tviro factors, the
subject and the object. Knowledge of the existential is
always indirect and representative. The personal idealists
will agree with Professor Pratt here. Professor Pratt
recognizes this dualism of subject and object thus recognizing
that knowledge of the physical world must be indirect and
representative. Ke differentiates between the epistemological
object and the ontological object. But having done this he
turns right around and says that he believes that the
epistemological object characterizes the ontological object.
Thus man conceives the physical vrorld just about as it is.
Though qualities belong to the realm of essence rather than
to the realm of existents, those qualities conceived in the
mental content which characterize the exi stents are intended
as qualities of the exi stents.
As seen from previous discussion, this parallel of
the epistemological object with the ontological object is
essential to the empirical method which Professor Pratt uses
to establish his realistic hypothesis. The correspondence
theory of truth is that truth is the correspondence of a
judgment with its object. The whole theory rests upon this
one a priori conception that the epistemological object must
5 Hnudson, PP, 363.
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characterize the ontological object. If the judgment of
experience does not actually parallel or characterize the
existential object, then there is absolutely nothing to
the correspondence theon,'- of truth; for one's experience or
judgment would not be the same as the object judged, and
though it appeared to be the same in experience it still
would not be in reality.
It may be agreed that Professor Pratt's epistemological
dualism is coherent to the extent that the subject sund object
are two different things, and that knowledge about the physical
world is always indirect. But to say that the epistemological
object characterizes the ontological object is an assumption.
Before this can be accepted as true it must be verified by
coherent reason.
II. IIETAPHYSICAL DUALISM
Most of the realists of history have held to a monistic
realism. They have believed that only matter is real, or that
neither matter nor mind are real, but that both come from
something else which they may call a neutral entity. Professor
Pratt feels that this is just aji atter.ipt to escape the real
mind-body problem and in doing so that they run into more
difficulties than they would to have faced the real problem.

19
Professor Pratt holds that there are two realities
in the universe: mind and matter. Though they are independent
realities, thej^ interact with each other in the same way as
the human mind and body. In this section the metaphysical
nature of each will be discussed. The follovfing section
is devoted to interaction as seen in the mind-body problem.
Mind. Though mind may deal with a non-existent object
of the conceptual realm., the mind itself is an existent.
Professor Pratt in distinguishing between the epi stemological
problem and the mind-body problem definitely speaks of
psychical existents. Mind is just as real as matter; psychical
.existents are just as real as physical existents.
Once it is really brought home to idealists as well
as realists that the mind-body problem is not concerned
with cognition and its object, but ivlth the non-cognitive
relation between a psychical existent and a physical
existent, it should at last be recognized even by them
that, no matter how imintere sting the problem may be,
it is at least real and natural. ... It is difficult
to see hov^ anyone can seriously maintain that the question
of the relation of his thoughts to his brain is purely
arbitarary and artificial.^
Though this may seem to be more primarily concerned
with the mind-body problem than with the existence of the
mind, it reveals Professor Pratt's real recognition of the
mind as an existent as well as, or better than, any other
quotation. Hot only does he speak of psychical existents.
4 Pratt, PR, 222.
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but the whole problem to vriiich he is referring is a problem
that would not exist without the acceptance of a metaphysical
dualism of mind and matter.
Professor Pratt finds it more necessary to spend time
establishing the reality of matter than the reality of mind.
Mind is presupposed by any attempt at thought, meaning, or
knovfledge. Any attempt at knowledge which does not recognize
mind as a reality really refutes itself, whether the
refutation be recognized or not.
The activities involved in knowing as depicted in
the account I have suggested are, frankly, incompatible
with a view of the mind which would make it either a
physiological process of the organism, or a passive
succession of psychoses — just so much passing content.
The activities of thought, of meaning, of transcendence
which CLre involved in anything that I can regard as an
adequate account of the knowing process presupposes the
reality of an active self. In spite of what seems to
me its manifest superiority to the other forms of
realistic epistemolog^'-, I do not see how Critical Healism
can really be "worked" without the recognition of mental
activity and a subject which acts.^
Though this is a discussion of the metaphysical reality
of mind, we find that it is presupposed in Professor Pratt's
epistemology. His approach as seen above is mostly pragmatic.
That is, the experience of meaning implies a subject to which
it is meaningful. Rovrever, there is also an appeal to
coherence. In the folloiving quotation this is more evident.
Pratt, PR, 203-204.
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The same unavoidable implication of consciousness
or mind is involved in the attej-ipt of both Objective
Relativism and Instrumentalism to deal >/ith the
question of knov/ledge v/ithout reference to anything
subjective or mental. For them as for the Neo-roalists
knowledge is a relation between objects and involves no
subject.
^
NoiT the picture of knowledge thus resulting appears
to me, personally, I confess, as unrecogniz9.ble as
Hainlet -without the Prince. In the mere relation of
objects to each other, or to a nervous system, or to
the action of a nervous system in the presence of
"given" objects, I can find nothing even remotely
resembling what I Lnaw and experience as the act of
knov-fing. I can put no meaning into the assertion of
knowledge v/hen there is no subject to do the kncfwing.*^
Professor Fratt's main argument may be summed up in
saying that mind is presupposed in experience and in thinking.
The argument is largely empirical. Though there is an element
of coherence in it, the empliasis does not seem to fall on the
synoptic view. He says little if anytning about meruory and
self-identity as being of any significance to the reality of
mind. He likevvise says ver^ little or nothing about values
being personal, or about values having any special significance
as to the reality of a self.
However, in the chapter in Personal Realism titled
"Knowledge and Self" Professor Pratt implies that his argument
is rational.
The type of axgument I ha.ve used in criticism of
all these schools is in considerable degree epistexaological.
It seem.s to show and in my opinion it does show —
that recognition, thought, knowledge presuppose a subject,...
6 Pratt, PR, 188.
^ Pratt, PR, 189.
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If, therefore, a sound episteinoloQ' sriov/s thfjt such
things as recognition and thought are ^aningless
unless there be a unifying subject or self, the only
conclusion that can be dravm is that auch a self does
actually be.,.. If such an adraission seems to the
idealist dfuigerously realistic, let him do vv-ith it
what he can. Let us hope, at any rate, that his loyalty
to reason v/ill prove stronger than some anti-realistic
prejudice.^
Professor Pratt is of course referring here to the
absolute idealist and not to t?ic personal idealist, for the
personal idealist recognizes the realit\^ of the human self
as being a self separate from the eternal self. On the
subject of the reality of mind and of the self personal
idealists agree very closely v/ith Professor Pratt. They
may vary slightly in their approach by eraploying more of
the synoptic vie\'.r. Personal idealists ivill likev/ise agree
closely on the subject of the mind-body problem, but the
greatest contention that arises is on the problem of the
ultimately real. This is our next problem. Though there
seems to be a great gap between idealism and realism,
perhaps there is more agreement on such things as the
realit^r of irdnd and of the self than has been supposed.
Ila.rever, there is some variation as to the natiare
of the self, even though they are in agreement that the self
really exists. Professor Pratt believes the self to be an
invisible and intangible substance. Ke believes it i.ust be
Pratt, PR, 288 -b9.

23
a substance because it can possess qualities. This subject
is discussed further in the next chapter. 'Suffice it to say-
here that there does seeiri to be some difference in thinking of
the self as that v^hich v/e knovT as consciox:isness, and as that
vdiich is a substajice vf ;ich thou^,h invisible and intangible
>ias qualities and characteristics.
llatter. Having established mind as a reality by
recognizing that all e:cperience and Vnowledge implies a
subject, a self, a laaower; the task of establishing matter
as a reality av/aits us, and appears to be oven more difficult
than the first. To the materialist and to the behaviorist
this would be simple, for they accept it a priori as being
real even to the extent that they feel obliged to try to
explain all consciousnoos by it; but for the idealist and
the dualistic realist the problem is more difficult.
Professor Pratt is an empiricist v/hen dealing with
the existential v-orld. As vre have seen in the study of the
epistemolOj^ ic 1 problem, he differentiates betveen the
epistemological object and the ontological object; yet he
says tliat the fevo objects correspond, and that the
epistemological object even has those qualities wjiich are
intended by the ontological object. Referring back to the
chapter on the correspondence theory'- of truth, it is readily-
seen that the correspondence theory- is a basic principle in
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Professor Pratt's realistic hypothesis. Though he first
establishes the correspondence theory of truth, the tv;o are
-very closely related and interdependent. The vfhole tning
is an a priori acceptance of huraan experience as the true
revealer of the fundamental reality of the ercistential world.
Professor Pratt says the correspondence theory needs no
verification to prove the correspondence of the judf^rnent v/ith
its object. If the judgment corresponds v<-ith the object as
experienced it is true. He adanits that truth must be
verified by coherence in the conceptual world. But in the
world of existents no verification is needed. If the
judgment corres] ends with the object it is considered by
Professor Pratt to be true.
The correspondence theor^r of truth cannot be accepted
vrithout verification, yet in all fairness to Professor Pratt,
his exapirical arguments should be followed as he employs them
in the establisliment of his realistic hypothesis. There are
three things of importance \Thich :!'ust be accounted for in our
experience! (1) the fact that e:>:periences pop into our minds
quite unexpectedly and oftentimes xvithout similar previous
experience; (2) the fact that not only do we receive sense
stimuli, but tovo or more persons receive the very sairie
stin-oili; and (3) the fact that physical objects, such as
burning wood, continue in their process being umiratched and
unthoujjht of by any huiiian being. TVhen a fire is left burning
i(
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one returns to find the fuel consumed. 9 These coimaon
experiences demand an explanation, and Professor Pratt says
that realiGia ;^ives the best account of all of these experiences.
Other hypotheses, however, also take these exj^eriences
into account. To be sure the objective idealist, who holds
that all reality is only a iiiatter of the individual's experience,
is indeed unable really to e>qjlain these e::periences. The only
vmy he ^-,ets around their: is to refuse to consider them. But the
absolute idealist can exj)lain these experiences coherently, Ke
says that all these experiences are the experiences of God ejid
therefore need no further explanation. His difficult^' arises
in the explanation of the relationship of the finite self to
the absolute self. There is nothing; in these three types of
experience v/hich the personal idealist does explain.
The personal idealist vrill agree vrlth the realist in
saying that these experiences are explainable because something
external to all human beings vrho experience things really does
exist. But the personal idealist says that these objects are
not an independent reality; they are only phenomenally real.-'-'^
That vmich A'-e experience is objective to us. It is not just
our mind. It exists independent of our hxman minds. These
activities in the physical realm are not dependent upon huraan
perception or conception. Thus all of the experiences which
9 I ratt, PR, 142-44.
^ Knudson, DG, 138-39.
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Professor Pratt explains by realism are also explainable by
personal idealism. The difference is not in the objective
reality in experience, but in a difference of opinion as to
what the nature of the objective reality is. Professor
Pratt says that it is matter. The personal idealist says
that it is the mind or vrlll of God.
Professor Pratt definitely rejects this distinction
betv/een the phenomenal and the noumenal. Ke says that there
is no good reason for making such a distinction, "...the
point of view presented in this vol'ume does not recognize
the distinction between noumenal and phenomenal realms. "-'-1
The only -.vay that a non-spacial reality and a spacial
reality can be related is through the one's creating the
other or the t.To's interacting with each other. The materialist
says matter creates mind. The idealist says mind creates matter.
The dualistic realist ssys both mind and L.atter exist
independently and interact with each other.
The materialist doctrine destroys even the possibility
of reason, and is thus totally incoherent. It is refuted
more in detail elsewhere in this thesis.
The personal idealist solves the problem, by denying
the metaphysical .-eality of imtter.-^^ Hatter is really only
real in the realm of experience. In the roalm of metaphysics
11 Pratt, PR, 139.
12 See Knudson, PP, 362f
.
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only Ldnd is real. That vvhich Ls experienced as matter is
really the mind of God. This does not mean that matter is
not real. It is real in experience; but metaphysically it is
the mind of God or the Virill of God.
The personal realist solves the problem by saying that
metaphysically mind and n^atter are both real and tloat the unitj'-
of the tvro is achieved through an interaction between the tivo
which is like the interaction betY/-een the human self and body.
Both personal idealism and personal realism have their
difficulties. The personal idealist leaves the question v/ith
a difficult explanation as to how non-spatial mind is made
spatial in experience. It is the v:ill of God iiiade real by
God in His experience and human experience. The personal
reali'jt leaves the question mth a difficult explanation as
to ho'.7 non-spatial mnd can interact with a spatial reality.
Both the personal idealist and the personal realist
explain the facts of e:q)erience through the interaction of
the self v.dth the objective world. Lut the
j
ersonal idealist
says that it is actually an interaction of the self vfith the
v/ill of God; v/hile the realist says that it is an interaction
of the self with a real and independently real existential
v/orld.
How it is easier to explain the interaction of mdnd
with mind, so it is easier to see how interaction is possible
if the ultimate reality of the physical is the mind of God.
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Thus interaction is between tvro Liinds and not between idnd
and physical reality. Thus in this aspect of the proclem,
the personal idealist can e-plain the situation more easily
than the personal realist.
Hov/ever, when it comes to the natter as to hoiv the
mind of God is rrade objectively real in hiunan experience,
it seems that the personal idealist is in almost as
embarrassing a difficulty as the personal realist on the
question as to ' .ovr tv:o thin>^s so utterly different could
interact. The only way that the personal idealist can get
around this problem is to saj' that that which is objectively
real in human experience is not metaphysically real. Leta-
physically it is mind. Thus to the realist tais appears
to be makin^i, the objectively -eal in huiaan experience really
an illusion. This is netiirally very objectionable to his
realistic v;ay of looking at the universe.
Let it be kept in mdnd here that though Professor Pratt
believes in the complete imrianence of God in the universe, he
also believes that matter is an independent reality. He
refuses to make any distinction between the nounienal and the
phenomenal. Matter is an existential reality, existing in
its ovm ri[ht. The correspondence of tliis judgment y.dth the
object, matter, as we experience it needs no verification.
The universe has two metaphysical realities which interact
with each other: mind ajid matter.
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III. THE IvUNE-BODY PROBLEM
In the endeavor to find the truth regarding the reality
of matter, the subject of God ajid His relation to matter has
come into the discussion. Kovrevor, let us not confuse this
vrith the mind-body problem. Though Professor Pratt likens
the relationship of God and the physical universe to that of
the hurr^an self and its body, it is not the subject to be
discussed here. The problem here is the relation of the human
mind to the nerve centers in the hirnian body. It is a fitting
subject to be included in this chapter for interaction
becomes part of the main realistic hypothesis.
The physiologists of today have been able to trace the
nervovis system. The; have been able to observe the psycho-
physiological process of the pai:sing of a stim.ulus through
the various sense organs, throu^^h the sensor^-- neurons, from
dendrites to axons composing the synapse, to arious nerve
centers, from ivhich often comes a return m.otor stimulus through
an entirely different set of neurons, the motor neurons, passing
from synapse to the muscles where they cause activity in space. -^^
This ner>7ous activity, though it can be traced
physiolo^jically, is not synonymous v/ith mind or consciousness.
oTien a person receives a stimulus he is not conscious of all of
this activity going on, he is only conscious of the sensation
Goodenough, DP, 71-bl, b3-112.
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at the locality where the stiinulus v/as given. Likewise v/hen
he decides to i.:ove his finder he is not conscious of ell the
nervouo activity o°i^o through the various notor neurons, but
he vfills to Eove it and it roves- Sometimes he is not conscious
of even willing the activity, it I'^y c:a..e rather spontaneously
from a habit vrhlch iriakes a motor response in a lov.-er norve
center. By concentration on this physical oide of the question,
m.any students have thou<;^ht tho.t ];iind is i.^erely the result of
the functioning of this highly developed nervous system. Almost
everyone adirdts that the development of this nervous system
hs.s a lot to do v/ith tlie functioning of Blind, but there are
many -.Yho be'.ieve that there must be an element of jrdnd v/nich is
more than just the functioning of the physical organism, and
which must direct to a large extent some of the ph^. sical
organism's activities. Professor Pratt is one of those vrho
believes that the lidnd is a separate realitjr, in his hypothesis
of dualistic realism both mind and matter are real. Thus the
problem, here is a problem as to the relation of mind and matter
in life.
Professor Pratt recognizes the foregoing i)hysiological
facts, but v/ishes to establish the relationsliip befc'/een v.rhat
is kn'Tn as consciousness in experience to the main centers
of the physiolo^ ical nervous sj^stem. The physical brain and
the mind are b^^' no liioans synonymous, yet the;^' seem to influence
each other. Hov/ do they influence each other?
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A uionist solves the problem by saying that either one
or the other is really the other and so there is no problem;
but the dualist Ernst luake some eicplanation or find some
hypothesis to explain the apparent relationship. Some idealists
have held to the theor;; of parallelism. This is the hypothesis
that there is no actual relationship beti^een the mind and the
physical brainj but that God or nature lias set up a system
vifhereby tho activit^^' in one is paralleled by a conception or
activity in the other, neither affect tlie other in such a
theory, but they both ^o alon^ to^^ether as though tim-ed for
perfect hariuony. Leibniz called such a theory of his the theoi^'
of pre-est8blished harmony. This theor^,^ is conceivable, but
it does not satisfactorily explain the facts of experience.
Parallelism also creates other problems equally as difficult.
Interaction of mand and body is apparently the only
solution which meets the situation vj-ith but fe^v difficulties.
To be sure, there are many things about the hypothesis v;hich
can not be thoroughly explained. But there seems to be no way
of explaining the facts of e:q)erience except through some
kind of an intoro-ction beti'/een the mind and the ph;;) sical
brain. The mind Biust be able to effect the brain to cause
its purposes to be ]i.ade effective through the stimulating
of the motor neurons thus causing motor activities. Likewise
14 Pratt, I.IA.S, 68,
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the physical nervous system must be able to act upon the ridnd
to m.ake it conscious of its physical enviromnent. Thus the
tvAO in some manner interact with each other. Though this
hypothesis of interaction of mind and body cannot be explained
very tangibly, there is more evidence for it than against it.
The hypothesis of interaction of mind and body is the
only consistent hypothesis which allows for the freedom of the
humein mind. Parallelism does not satisfactorily explain the
facts of experience. 15 Mind acts purposively upon matter and
matter influences mind. Epiphenomenalism must believe in
determinism by the physical. Absolute idealism, melees it all
the mind of God, and thus allows for no freedom whatsoever.
Freedom is only an illusion to the absolute idealist. Even
an idealismi which allmvs for independent finite selves carjiot
allcv for freedom without the accepts-nce of interaction between
the mand end the objective world. Only the hypothesis of
interaction of mind and body allows for the purposes of a
finite irdnd to find expression by acting upon a physical universe.
The reality of hunan purpose is dependent upon the reality of
the hypothesis of interaction of mind and body. 16
Professor Pratt cites four difficulties which m.ake it
hard for some to accept interaction: (l) Mind and body are
so different in natiire that it is difficult to see hov; they
15 See Pratt, ms , 88: and Dotterer, BYS, 206.
16 Macintosh, RR, 44-47.
1I
i i
1
33
could influence or interact vrxth each other, (2) There seems
to be an incoinpatibility betvreen the hypothesis of interaction
and the law of the conservation of energy. (3) It is evident
that consciousness is partly dependent upon physical conditions.
(4) The conception of mind is vague and confusing making it
difficult to see how it could interact with the body.^*^
The first of these difficulties can be settled only
by showing that all types of causation are of such a nature
that it is difficult to ujtiderstand them.. It is difficult to
explain the pull of the moon upon the ocean cansing high and
lovr tides. V'e know that there is such a pull, because we can
measure the pull that smaller bodies have upon one another.
But as to the nature of the pull we cannot say. So also we
cannot say how the mind and body interact, all we can say is
that they do interact. T/e know this to be true through experience.
The second of these difficulties is not nearly the
difficulty that it is supposed to be. There is no reason to
believe that the mind should add to or take aivay from the
energy found in the physical realm. To say that the mind can
direct the energy in the physical body is to say quite a
different thing. "No reason of either an a priori or an
empirical sort has as yet been suggested to show that in
interaction between body and mind a transfer of physical
energy would be necessary . "-^^
^7 Pratt, PR, 263.
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Thirdly, though consciovsness is effected by bodily
conditions, there is no reason to believe that it is caused
entirely by the physical. In cases of actual aphasia where
certain parts of the nervous system have been destroyed, it
has been possible to educate other sections of the brain to
do the Vv'ork which had normally been done by the destroyed
regions. Likewise rats have had sections of their brains
removed, and it has been found that they can be re-educated,
by the education of other parts of the brain, so as to perform
normally. Even the dependence of habits upon specific neural
paths is becoming doubtful. "The conclusion that seems to be
emerging is that the brain r-rorks largely as a whole; and that
the different parts of the mind live, but are, rather, tools
which the unitary/ being, the psyche, uses,. . . ."19
The fourth difficulty is only a difficulty to those
who do not accept the reality of the self. If the conception
of mind be vague it would be difficult to see how it mij^jht be
a thing which could interact with the body, or the brainj but
if it is looked upon as a unified self, then it is easier to
see how it could have sufficient identity to interact with the
body. The relation of the body to the self is a unique
relationship. It can be verified only through experience. 20
19 Pratt, PR, 256-57.
20 Pratt, PR, 269.
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After having refuted the foregoing arguments. Professor
Pratt's v/hole argument is empirical. He says the only way we
can knovf that the self interacts with the body is through
experience. TVe know through experience that the self acts
upon the body and the body acts upon the self.
TMiat we actually live through and immediately realize
is a self acting in various ways and having various
experiences: a self, or subject, or psyche, perceiving,
conceiving, thinking, hoping, feeling, deciding, acting.
"(Then the self acts upon the outer world it acts by
mesms of its body. The relation is very close, but
as I have pointed out in another connection, it would
be a mistake to make the relation between the self and
its body so intims.te as to identify . them or assert that
the body is a part of the mind or self. . . .21
The hypothesis of interaction becomes increasingly
important as it is applied to the universe as a whole. The
mind-body problem is limited to the question of the relation
of the human mind to the human body. However, Professor Pratt
believes that the ultimate nature of the whole universe is
very much like the relation between the hvui;an mind and body.
The universe is a dualism of process. Interaction of mind
and matter then is a basic principle throughout the whole
universe. This will be discussed more in detail in the next
chapter under the sub-heading; Interaction of the mind and
body of God. Interaction is the thread which makes unity
possible v/ith a dualism.
21 Pratt, PR, 267.
22 Pratt, PR, E72.
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CHAPTER IV
THE SPIRITUAL PANTiiEISM OF J. B. PRATT
Professor Pratt classifies the philosophies of the world
into five principal hypotheses concerning the nature of the worldi
"(1) Materialistic Naturalism, (2) Dualistic and A.theistic
Pluralism, (3) Deism or Transcendental Theism and the conception
of the Finite God, (4) Spiritual Pantheism, and (5) Absolute
Idealism."^ He discards the first two as being impossible
and absolutely incoherent hypotheses. The last three are
accepted as being quite possible, being consistent within
themselves, and taking into account all the experiences of life.
I. THE SELECTION OF HYPOTHESES
Llaterialistio Naturalism . Materialists have been unable
to agree on one fundamental point. Some materialists assert
that consciousness and bodily correlation are identical; others,
that they are separate factors, but that all mental content and
activity is completely determined by bodily conditions.
Consciousness can never affect the body. Matter is always the
cause J consciousness can never be the cause. "Naturalism
insists that physical causation determines all events.
1 Pratt, PR, 354.
2 Pratt, PR, 357.
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Therefore purpose can never act as a cause. The mind has no
influence on the body, it is merely a phenomenon of the bodily
process. Those who can not accept materialism as a dogmatic
faith and who accept coherence as verification of truth,
acknowledge that such a hypothesis is not at all in keeping
with the everyday experience of hiiman life. Human beings
plan and carry out their plans. Men establish or accept
purposes which they endeavor to attain throughout their lives.
Likewise when it comes to the question of the orij;in and the
ultimate reality of the universe, materialism cannot explain
its development. Materialism looks at the long sequence of
events maintaining that each previous event vr&s the cause of the
one following. But this is a supposition* The actual fact is
only a sequence of events. If man grew out of the universe,
then the universe is the kind of a universe that produced man.
This qualifies the imiverse as being something more than a
pxirely material and mechanical system of purely physical
causation; for man is more than just physical. Thus materialistic
naturalism is disqualified in the selection of a hypothesis.
3
Dualistic and Atheistic Pluralism, This hypothesis
does not have quite as many difficulties as did the first; but
although avoiding the materialistic naturalist's conception, it
3 See Pratt, ms , 46-47; Pratt, APR, 78-10^; Macintosh,
RR, 41-44; and Brightman, ITP, 232-34.
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is maintained that life plays a very small part in the universe,
and that there is no universal purpose. There are at least
two kinds of beings in the world, material objects and finite
conscious creatures. There is possibly a third, organic but
unconscious beings. The world is an aggregation of matter and
energy. Interaction is accepted, thus accovmting for the
experience of human purpose; but that there is any universal
purpose is denied. They make no endeevor to account for the
origin of life or the physical world, or at best say that life
developed out of the physical order of the universe. Thus this
hypothesis becomes scarcely a hypothesis at all; it is hardly
a coherent description of the phenomenal world. ^ Likewise
it must fall by the wayside.
Deism or Transcendental Theism, and the conception of
the Finite God.^ This is not one hypothesis, but two.
Professor Pratt should at least make a greater distinction
between the two even though he does not accept either of them.
The difference between Deism and the Finite God is far greater
than the difference between Spiritual Pantheism and the Finite
God. The Deist maintains that God is completely transcendent.
The Theist of the Finite God holds the conception that God is
both immanent and transcendent. Professor Pratt objects to
transcendence on the basis that dualistic realism requires that
4 Pratt, PR, 356.
^ Pratt, PR, 354.
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God be immanent, for only thus can God's purposes be made
causal. The purposes of God can only be made efficient
through a relationship of mind and matter which is like that
of the h\jman mind and body. If interaction is the only wfty
for purpose to be made efficient, then God must be immanent
to be efficient.
As the modern concept of causation, leads us to
conceive of the universe as an organic vmole, a
network of relations and of parts sensitive to and
mutually influencing each other, so ar exeiiination
of purpose and the meaning of its efficiency points
to the conclusion that, if the v/orld be really
teleological, the relation between the cosmic pvirpose
and the cosmic process must be analogous to that
between a self and its body.
The difficulty in seeing how purpose can be efficient
except in immanent fashion is only one of the obstacles
Wiiich make it hard to accept either Deism or a Theism
which depicts God wholly or chiefly in transcendent
terns. . .
At this point Professor Pratt drops the argument
against the transcendence of God, and with a method of more
or less v/ishful thinking strikes at the conception of the
Finite God.
But the Theism of the Finite God, as presented by
certain schools of Christian theology, and as defended
by William James, certainly makes a strong appeal to
the moral sense and throvrs down a thrilling challenge
to the man in each of us. So strong is this appeal
that for many yeaz's to come — possibly to the end of
human history — it will have a considerable following.
Much, moreover, of a theoretical sort can be said in
its favor. I have too ruch respect for it and for
^ Pratt, PR, 371.
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many who cherish it, to subject it here to serious
criticism. But I am bound to say that, for me, and
I think, for very many people, belief in it is becom.ing
steadily more difficult. "a -;;od davm in the dirt" as
James used to call him, a power among other powers,
conscious of an indifferent or hostile environment, a
struggling, often thwarted God, who has noble aims, uses
various means to achieve them, yearns for a better
world, and v;-ho m.ay eventually with our aid realize his
glorious hopes, -- t is is not the kind of explanation
of our universe that the intellect seeks, nor is it
the Determiner of Destiny which our religious nature
demands
.
This whole objection seems to be largely "wishful
thinking." He admits that it is theoretically sound, yet his
conception of the virtue of all powerfulness turns his mind.^
It seems only fair to the hypothesis of the finite God to ask
a few questions regarding this unfounded rejection. It might
be asked if a conception of an all powerful god who in his
spontaneous activities, ~ like a big play boy am.used with
himself — v,rith but little consideration for humanity, is
the "Determiner of Destiny which our religious nature demands?"
?«Tiich does our religious natiire demani inost, a belief that God
is all powerful and inclined to wildness; or a belief that
though he is working against necessarj' situations involving
evil for some of humanity, yet he is a God of good purposes
and of sufficient power to keep progressing in spite of evil.
The question might also be asked if the intellect seeks that
7 Pratt, PR, 372. Cf. Brightman, FG, 13 and 166-193.
8 Cf. Wright, SPR, 396.
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of which it has no possibility of knowing? The intellect
certainly does not seek to establish its own ignorance. The
intellect seeks to understand God and the universe. Any
explanation which appeals to our ignorance of God's purposes
and values does not satisfy a seeking intellect.
Professor Pratt in his earlier v/ork Mind and Spirit
,
in a similar way begs the question. He says that personal
idealism can be constructed only upon two bases: some form, of
panpsychism or the Kantian theory of knowledge. He says both
are unsafe. He quotes Perry' s figure, "once the Kantian theory
j
of knowledge is accepted, personal idealism is on a slippery
inclined plane with the Absolute waiting at the bottom." Then
he proceeds to delight in drawing a picture of this steep
slippery plank with a crocodile waiting at the bottom with jav/-s
i
extended already for the pathetic fit-ure of the personal idealist.^
j
Such question begging can hardly be taken seriously.
|
In the consideration of Professor Pratt's rejection of
the Finite God there seems to be no reason why he should have
to reject the hypothesis for sjiy coherent reasons. The Finite
God is just as coherent with dualistic realism, as his
conception of God, It may be true that a transcendent God would
not be coherent with his hypothesis of the interaction of mind
and body from the realistic point of view, but there is no rational
i
9 Pratt, MS, 214-15.
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reason apparent in his discussion v^hich makes it impossible
to accept the idea of the Finite God. This rejection seems
to be largely a personal predisposition.
Absolute Idealism. Continuing nov^r with the five
principle hypotheses, Absolute Idealism and Spiritual Pantheism
are left as possible choices. Absolute Idealism is the
hypothesis that God not only knows about everything;, but that
He literally shares the experience of His finite parts. -^^ God
is the sum total of all being and all experience. The difficulty
with this hypothesis is that selves are not divisible. How can
the sum of all the experiences of human selves be God'
s
experience? The experience of a self can not be the experience
of another self or of God.
I consider Absolute Idealism of the sort v/hich
completely identifies finite consciousness with the
Absolute's consciousness, quite untenable. . . . The
human experiences of ignorance, of wonder, of
finitude, of defeat, are such that in the very
nature of the case they could, not be shared by an
All-Knower who had presented to him the answer to
every question, an Infinite Mind whose 'vYill (so far
as one may attribute Vfill to him) was eternally
satisfied. 12
Though the Absolute Idealist might say that God is not
eternally satisfied, there would still be lacking any real
explanation as to how finite experience could become a part
10 Hocking, MGHE, 573.
11 Pratt, PR, 373.
12 Pratt, PR, 373. Of. Pratt, APR, 113-124.

43
of the Infinite experience. A self is indivisible. Matter
may be divided into parts, but selves are not divisible.
A self is a whole, an indivisible unit. Thus Professor
Pratt, it laust be adrrdtted, does have a coherent reason for
not accepting Absolute Idealism in its usual form. Hov^^ever,
it will be found that he accepts much of Absolute Idealism
in a moderated form in his Spiritual Pantheism. He finally
accepts the Cosmic Self as the }'iind of the universe, and the
physical universe is its body. Finite bodies are a part of
the infinite body, but the finite selves are separate
individuals and are no part of the Cosmic Self. It m.ay be
reasonably doubted whether such a conception can be rightly
called a pantheism, for the finite self is not a part of the
Absolute, and a distinction is made between the Cosmic Self
and his body. Professor Pratt's chief reason for calling
it a pantheism seems to be his conception of the organic
unity of the universe. The next section of this chapter
will be devoted to the metaphysics of this World Soul.
II. THE IvtETAPKYSICS OF THE WORLD SOUL
In the preceding section of this thesis it has been
shown indirectly that emergent evolution gives us only a list
of things as they appeared. Their history and their list
are probably correct, but if they stop with the list and
historjr, they have thrown no light on the extraordinary
11
1
i
t
i
t
1
1
1
i
i
1
44
things that they have described. The facts of emergent
evolution seem to point tov/ard the conclusion that the
development of at least part of the universe has been largely
directed by conscious purpose. Other world views trying to
explain these facts have been considered and disposed of by
Professor Pratt. In this section Professor Pratt's own
hypothesis attempting to explain the evidence of purpose
in the world will be expounded.
In speaking of purpose, no descriptions of the purposes
attributed to God are intended here. That will be considered
in the next section of this chapter; but here the chief concern
is to establish the hypothesis of the Cosmic Self on the basis
of the evidence of God's purposes in the world.
To deny that purposes are often causes is to
involve oneself in all the difficulties, not to
say absurdities, which make both Materialism and
Parallelism essentially fantastic, ^3
The Cosmic Self . If purposes are often causes then
how are they causes? It might be suggested that the purpose
is immanent in nature. It has even been suggested that the
purpose was an "unconscious purpose;" but as Professor Pratt
points out, an immanent purpose v/hen it is thought of as an
"unconscious purpose" is meaningless. "So long as we are
using the English language let us realize that an 'unconscious
purpose' is a contradiction in terms, and belongs in the realm
13 Pratt, PR, 360.
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of round squares. "1^ Purpose must be conscious. Therefore, there
must be a Cosmic Self, a V.orld Soul, if there is purpose in the
universe. These universal purposes can become causal only through
some such process such as that which we find in the mind-body
relation in human life.
The universe is an organic whole, every part of
which is directly or indirectly sensitive to, dependent
upon, and capable of influencing, every other part....
Reality is no "block-universe," but full of infinite
variety and constant change. It is temporal, not
static, a beginningless and endless process in time.
But it is not a fall or drive or blind rush of
separate atoms: rather it is the development and play
of a common and infinitely varied life. The purposive-
ness of this common life, manifested in all things,
leads me to believe that it is a conscious life; and
that the relation between it and the physical world
is that intimate and unique relation which we find
between our own conscious lives and bodies....
The Cosmic Self is much more than Just process.
Process cannot explain the continuous invention and origination
of new forms of increasingly higher value. Such purpose and
origination must be organic and must be the product of a
Cosmic Self. However, Professor Pratt believes that the
Cosmic Self does not plan ahead. His purposes are spontaneous
and are made causal immediately.
The purposes of such a cosmic llind m.ust not be
pictured after the manner of our thwarted and striving
purpose. Nor are they of the sort attributed by the
"design argument" to the finite God of non-immanent
Thei sm» The Cosmic Self of my hypothesis does not plan
Pratt, PR, 365. Cf. Pratt, APR, 88-90j and Dotterer, FNS, 359
15 Pratt, PR, 374-75.
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and scheme, nor does He make use of means to bring
about the ends He longs to achieve. There is no "far-
off divine event tov/ard which the whoie creation moves."
On the other hand, the purpose which seems to be present
in Nature is not to produce "just this," nor can it be
presented in any one stage of the world. The development,
the production of new forms, which one finds in organic
evolution, and presumably in cosmic evolution, is indeed
evidence of inner purpose, and the purpose is not simply
process as such. It is process in a fairly definite
direction, the continuous invention and origination of
forms of steadily higher value. -^^
It is difficult to ascertain just what Professor Pratt
means by purpose. In some places he says that all of God'
s
activities are purposeful. Yet in other places he speaks of
the spontaneity of God. One might question whether spontaneous
activity could be purposeful. It seems that it would have
to be "given." It might be purposive and yet not be purposeful.
To be sure a purposive activity may be purposive because it
serves a useful function; but to be purposeful it must have an
aim, an intention, or a resolution. If Professor Pratt means
that all of God's purposes are immediately efficient, it might
be questioned as to virhether they were purposes, or merely wills
to action.
The physical world is not dead but living, and it
is the body of God, All its activities are both
causal and purposeful — because in it, as in us,
purposes are efficient, which rieans they are causes.
It is iry hypothesis that the purposes of the Cosmic
Mind are completely efficient, as ours are not, and
that all the activities of its body (which is the
physical world) are purposive as well as causal
(which is obviovsly not the case with the processes
of our bodies,),. 17
1^ Pratt, PR, 375-76.
1'^ Pratt, PR, 375.
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It would seem that Professor Pratt means that God has
not ever held any long time purposes, all purposes being
immediately realized in causality. His purposes being
spontaneous are iraraediately realized. His activities are
all very spontaneous. Apparently he has no distant purposes
which he works toward. He is interested only in increasing
varieties of beauty which are beyond the human understanding.
These varieties of beauty might be referred to as transcendent
values. They are values only to God; man can not appreciate
them. These transcendent values vtf-ill be discussed in the
following section of the chapter. The question whether
such purposes can be real purposes must be left also to be
discussed in that section.
The Physical 'aVorld the Body of God . The quotation
immediately preceding, which has been employed to help clarify
Professor Pratt's position as to the efficiency of God's
purpose, also anticipates the present subject. As seen from
the quotation, if the physical world is to be considered
anything but the body of God, it would be impossible for
Professor Pratt to explain the efficiency of purpose in
the world. Purpose and causation are considered as the
detennining factors in the existential world only if purpose
can act causally. Purpose has been considered as determination
by the future; and causation determination by the past. Neither
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is entirely true. All we know about cause is the sequence of
events. Purpose to become a determining factor in the existential
world must be able to act causally. If the theory of interaction
be accepted as an actual solution to the rnind-body problem,
then purpose can act causally. But if the universal purposes
are to act causally, we must first accept the hypothesis that
the physical world is the body of God, The only possible way
for interaction to take place between the purposes of God and
the causal activities of the existential world — betv/een mind
and matter — is through e mind-body relationship or its
equivalent. TVe see universal purposes acting causally in our
experience of the universe. Therefore if we are to accept
universal purpose as being causal in the world, we must accept
the world as being the body of God,
Professor Pratt does not describe the body of God.
He says ver^,' little about the nature of the body of God,
apart from the general exposition of his realistic hypothesis.
The idea of the physical world being the body of God seems at
times to be little more than an illustration as to hov/ the
V'f'orld Soul can act upon the Physical World, Sometimes it is
put as a kind of analogy. The physical v/orld is infinitely
so much larger and so different in appearance from our finite
bodies, that it should not be thought of as being identical
or even similar. But the purpose that it serves according to
Professor Pratt, is the same purpose that the fi'iite body serves.
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That is, God interacts v/ith the physical world somewhat in
the same way that a human being interacts with his body,
God's purposes become efficient in the v;orld because the
world serves as a medixmi for His activities. God's will
is made efficient in his body the physical v/orld, just as a
human being's will is made efficient through his body. The
relation of the physical universe to the Cosmic Self, is the
same as that of the finite body to the finite self. The physical
world is the body of God in the sense of the purpose it fulfils.
The physical v/orld is not dead but living, and it
is the body of God. All its activities are both
causal and purposeful — because in it, as in us,
purposes are efficient, which means that they are causes.
However, Professor Pratt does make some distinction
between the relation of the Cosmic Self and its body and the
relation of the finite self and its body. The purposes of the
Cosmic Mind are completely efficient, so that all the activities
of its body are purposive as well as causal. It is this
complete efficiency of purpose, which would make one wonder
if what Professor Pratt would mean as being the purposes
of the Cosmic Mind are really purposes, for if they are
completely efficient could they possess any element of
futurity. This question, as suggested before, vnill be taken
up in more detail in the follovfing section. But vre should
make it very evident now that this distinction is made between
the body of the finite and the body of the Cosmic Self,
18 Pratt, PR, 375.
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It is my hypothesis that the purposes of the Cosmic
Mind are completely efficient, as ours are not, and that
all the activities of its body (which is the physical
v;-orld) are purposive as well as causal (which is obviously
not the case with the processes of our bodies). -^^
Interaction of the mind and body of God. Again the
preceding topic has been an anticipation of the present.
These terms and relations are so closely related that it is
difficult to discuss any one of them without bringing in all
of the others, for they all work together as a great system.
The existence of one is dependent upon the existence of the
other and vice versa.
As has been said before, purpose if it is to become a
determining factor in the existential vrorld must be able to
act causally. The only vmy that purpose can act is through
the interaction of the minH and body of God. If then, the
theory of interaction be accepted as a solution to the mind-
body problem, and the relationship of the mind and body of God
be considered similar in this respect, then universal purposes
can act causally. It is through the interaction of the Cosmic
Mind and its body that all the activities of its body become
purposive as well as causal. This is true of the universal
mind-body relationship, while it is not true of the finite
mind-body relationship; because, says Professor Pratt, the
purposes of the Cosmic Liind are completely efficient, while
19 Pratt, PR, 375.
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those of the finite rnind are not. Yet the process of
interaction of mind and matter is fundamentally the same as
the interaction found in the mind-body relationship of the
finite self.
This is a conclusion both unescapable and signifi-
cant. If you deny such action of the self upon its
body you deny the efficiency of purpose; and, if you
admit it, you must conclude that purposive action, so
far as we ever know it or have any direct evidence of
its existence, or are able in any way imaginatively to
realize it, is always immanent. For what we refer to
as the interaction of mind and bo4y is not the erter-
nal kind of action which one finds when one billiard
ball hits ajiother. The category'- under which the mutual
influence of the self and its body should be conceived
is not mechanical, but much more like the biological.
The ujiion of the tv/o is peculiarly intimate: they have
somehow becoKe organic to each other.
The universe is an organic whole, every part of
which is directly or indirectly sensitive to,
depenc^ent upon, and capable of influencing, every
other part,.,. The purposiveness of this common
life, manifested in all things, leads me to believe
that it is a conscious life; and that the relation
between it and the physical world is that intimate
and unique relation which we find between our mnn
conscious lives and our bodies,
III, THE METAPHYSICS OF THE SELF
The origin of the finite self . Professor Pratt considers
the universe a beginningless and an endless process in time,
and makes no attempt to account for its origin. However, he
does attempt a very brief account of the origin of the finite
self. The account is entii-ely in the form of an analogy. It
20 Pratt, PR, 370. Cf. Dotterar, H;S, 200-210.
21 Pratt. PR. 574-75. ^^^^^^^^^^^^
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is based upon the facts of eiriergent evolution, though its
implications reach far beyond the factual realm. The finite
self and body are very much like the Cosmic Self and its body
in metaphysical nature, though they vary in degree of efficiency
and various other aspects. This likeness makes it very probable
that finite selves grew out of the infinite self, '.e cannot
know the detailed process b^ which this was done, but v/e can
be rather certain of the finite self's origin. At least it is
a very tenable hypothesis, and there is nothing in it which is
not consistent with the whole of Professor Pratt's hypothesis.
The nature of the hujnan self has been used as the basis for
the hypothesis of the Cosmic Self, If the hypothesis of the
}
Cosmic Self be truej it must also be true that the finite
self grew out of the Cosmic Self for they both possess that
unique characteristic of self-hood.
V7e as selves grow out from, the universal life,
in somewhat the sajne irysterious or simple fashion
in which buds, in the springtime, grow out from the
twigs and branches of the trees. The 'Torld itself
is soul and body, and both our souls and our bodies
grow quite naturally out of it. The details of the
process are unknown to us; but if one adopts the
general principles of causation and efficient purpose
suggested in this volume, I do not see that there
is any special difficulty in this derivation of the
individual selves.
The nature of the finite self. Much b»s already been
said regarding the parallel activities of tlie finite self
and body and the Cosmic Self and bodyj but little has been
22 Pratt, PR, 382.
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said about the metaphysical nature of the self. The
materialist will acknowledge no reality of the self. The
self, as a materialist sees it is nothing more than a
phenomenal consequence or the result of the physical
fvmctioninp; of the body. But the idealists and dualistic
realists, and perhaps some psvchologists, agree that the
self is much more than this, that it is an independent reality.
Perhaps created by God, but having freedom, the self may be
considered an independent reality. "...There is in the self
a non-rational existential aspect which can never be reached
by conceptual description and which can be realized onlj'" by
intuition. .. Professor Pratt says again, that we may know
the self, but that we can only know it through experience.
Vie cannot scientifically describe the self j but through
experience we are certain of its existence. It seem.s un-
reasonable that any philosopher can deny the realit;^' of the
subject which does the denying.
There are chiefly two conceptions of the nsture of
the self, Som.e forms of idealism identify the self with
consciousness. Others have various forms of soul theories.
Professor Pratt considers the self as a substance. The self
is characterized by passing sensa, but this is a relatively
vmimportant matter. These ere only part of the activities
of the self.
23 Pratt, PR, 315.
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The self is a substance. Vie have considerable
knovrledf:e about it, and a certain iicrnediate realization
of it. It is not a blank and abstract substance nor a
blank unity, but a substance with qualities, a unity
that possesses rich varietj'^. These qualities or
characters and this variety are seen in the conscious
states of the self and in its activities. It is
characterised b^^ its passing; sensa — a relatively
unimportant matter — by its memories, its tendencies,
its activities, its powers or potentialities for action,
its efforts of attention and will, its reasoning power,
its sentiments, its purposes, 24
The individuality of the self . Professor Pratt calls
his hypothesis Spiritual Pantheism; however, he does not imply
that one self can be a part of another self, or that a finite
self can be a part of the Cosmic Self. Matter is divisible
into parts, but a self is indivisible. The self never loses
its identity in a social group. The self never loses its
identity in its union with the Cosmic Self, "Consciousness
of union involves consciousness of difference, "25
If the pantheistic view here presented be incom-
patible vvdth the reality and the relative independence
of the self, I shall v/ithout hesitation modify it, or
even give it up. But I do not see that the two views
are fundamentally inconsistent. For the Over-soul I
have sought to present is not a Vedantic Brahma nor a
Roycean Absolute. Our experiences are not conceived
as being identical parts of its experience. Our minds
are not identical parts of its mind, though certainly our
bodies are parts of its body,.,. Matter is divisible
into parts: mind is not,... Minds do not have parts,
nor can different minds be combined so as additive ly
to com.pose a new one. 26
24 Pratt, PR, 315-16.
25 Pratt, PR, 382.
26 Pratt, PR, 380. Of. Pratt, API^ 138-140,
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The metaphysical possibilities of immortality * Through-
out Professor Pratt's hypothesis is seen the dualism of mind
and body. This dualism of process is found both in the universe
and in man. Man seems to be pulled between his physical limitations
and his highest mental aspirations. He is comparatively a free
thinking being, yet he is also somewhat subject to the limitations
of his physical body. The question of immortality has been one
of long standing. Though man is a comparatively free thinking
being, will he continue his existence after his physical
body ceases to function? Body is not mind nor self, and
self is not body. But v^ill the inind, the self, continue on
without the body? The self possesses a considerable degree
of independence of the body which seems to increase with
increasing age. There is no a priori justification for the
denial of the self surviving a bodily death. Part of the
conscious life is dependent on both self and body, but other
parts of the psychic life are obviously not dependent upon the
body. Facts of clairvoyance and telepathy are evidence of the
latter.
More significant is the steadily increasing
probability of the reality of telepathy and super-
normal knowledge. Investigations by many scientific
workers that have been carried on now for many years
have piled up a mass of factual evidence for clair-
voyajice, telepathy, and kindred phenomena which I,
for one, cannot pass over as negligible.... The most
natural conclusion to draw from the acceptance of
this view is that in certain situations selves are
able to influence each other without the intervention
of cerebral or other bodily means...,
27 prntt. PR. 7>F>0,
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Professor Pratt's metaphysics, allowing an increasing
amount of independence to the self, makes way for at least
a fond hope that man is not through here.^^
For on this hypothesis the Over Soul is the source
of our spirits; and it might well be also in Augustine's
phrase, "the goal of our pilgrimage, and our resting
place by the way," Nor v^ould it be unreasonable to
suppose that He has made us for Himself, and that our
hearts are, therefore, restless till they rest in Him.^^
IV. THE PURPOSES OF THE COSMIC AUTIST
Transcendental values . Perhaps the greatest problem
that confronts any pantheism is the problem of evil. If God
is a good God and at the same time an Almighty God, his
purposes being completely efficient in the world; how can
the existence of evil be accounted for? Though evil is not
only a problem to pantheism, but likewise a fact of experience
that all philosophies of religion must explain, it is more
of a problem to pantheism, for pantheism, identifying God
with the whole imiverse, identifies God with evil.
Professor Pratt solves this problem by saying that
these things which appear as evil to hmnan beings are not evil
in God's experience. God has purposes which man cannot know.
God lives in such an entirely different perspective that h\«nan
values become insignificant when contrasted with the greater
values of the whole.
28 Cf. Pratt, RC, 225-254.
29 Pratt, PR, 383. Cf. Pratt, APR, 209-220.
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His life is full of finite death, his delight
includes sorrow and anguishj endless spontaneity and
iinmeasureable contrasts, pleasure and pain, stars cind
the sweep of systems, the terror of the storm as well
as the calm of the June day, wildness, cold, darkness,
joy, — all these are actualities in His nature; but
so ujiited, it may be, that were our minds great enough
to conprehend them together, we should find in the V/hole
an overwhelming and unspeakable beauty, a beatific vision.
This confused picture of the extreme forms of hiunan
experience leads the reader to consider God either as being
irresponsible and wild, or to consider ourselves as being
ignorant of his purposes. Professor Pratt chooses the latter,
which however, also implies the former. The reader is almost
led to believe that God scarcely has any purpose in human life
whatsoever. Professor Pratt, in his conclusion, considers the
question and turns it over to religion as an impossible
problem for philosophy.
Clearly the Cosmic Self suggested in our discussion
eternally creates what are for Himself the highest
values. It will be asked. Does he create values for
us also? And this question, I suppose, is one v/ith
the question whether He has "made us for himself."
I do not know whether philosophy can answer. Religion
can and does. And if philosophy is unable to make
here any positive assertion, I do not see how it can
forbid the conviction of both Buddhism and Christianity
that insight and love are at the very rieart of Being. 31
Professor Pratt turns the problem over to religion
leaving room for God's interest in mankind, but much that he
said preceding seemed quite skeptical at this point.
30 Pratt, PR, 379-380.
31 Pratt, PR, 384. Cf . Pratt, APR, 203.
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But here as elsewhere, the true appreciation of
beauty must be disinterested. Too often in the past
beauty, as well as goodness, of the Lord has been
veiled and distorted by an attempt to identify it with
an imagined exclusive care for us human darlings. 32
If God be the 'A'orld Soul there is an element of
wildness in Him not recognized in the usual picture
of "Our Heavenly Father." Even in such excellent
and recent books as the able treatises by Dr.
Tennant and Archbishop Temple, the figure of God
that emerges retains a little too much of the
glorified clergyman. -53
If Professor Pratt's conception of God's values as being
beyond man's perspective is to be accepted, then the problem of
evil is solved. Evil then becomes only a relative matter among
human beings. There are no eternal values which have ar^
significance to man. God's purposes almost totally, if not
entirely, transcend even the highest values conceived by man.
To say the least, it is interesting to compare Professor
Pratt's view of the transcendent values of God with his view
of God's entirely immanent existence in the universe. It must
be admitted that the contrast is lessened by allowing for the
separate existence of the finite selves. But even so does not
the immanence of God in human physical bodies as well as in all
their physical environment suggest that He must be conscious
of the existence of man as a free being. If so, it seems that
God would recognize a free being as having significance which
32 Pratt, PR, 378.
33 Pratt, PR, 379.

59
supersedes the significance of His own body, the physical world
which is subject to His will. Furthermore, completely transcendent
values and free selves are incompatible, because it is not
consistent to believe that free selves vfho could act upon the
body of God would or could be totally disregarded by God. God
would have to acknowledge their free nature and have a conception
of value regarding them.
As Professor Pratt pictures God, God is not a social
being, but a lonely artist who is creating and acting upon
values which are to His ov-m taste and real only to Himself.
Man is ignorant of God's valvxes. This implies that Man's
values are only relative. That which is seen as evil by man
is not necessarily evil to God. Thus God can be completely
immanent in the physical universe and still be absolutely
good, for man knows nothing about God's goodness.
Such an appeal to the ignorance of value as a means
of solving the problem of evil should not go by unchallenged.
Professor Pratt does not commit himself definitely to m8iiy
of the im.pli cations of his conception of Godj but this much
can be said very definitely that the quotations in this
section of this thesis imply definitely that God is not as
interested in man as has been supposed, and that man is
ignorant of God's values. It has already been pointed out
that the transcendence and freedom of the finite self is not
consistent v;-ith the conception that God vfould not be interested
i:
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in that self. The fact that the self is free and transcends
God should ri:ake the self more prominent in God's experience
than the physical universe which does not transcend God and
which is subject to his will.
Furthermore, to appeal to human ignorance of God's
values undermines the whole basis for 1 nowledge. Even the
simple admission that the problem of evil is vmsolved does
not do this. To say that God's values completely transcend
huiaan experience implies that all hutuan values are relative
even including the value of truth. If truth is relative,
can one appeal anjrmore to reason and to coherence than to
wishful thinking or intuition? However, to admit the
unsolved problem of evil, or to offer another solution which
does not appeal to the necessary ignorance of man, is to
continue to trust the resources of the hviman mind in its
interpretation of human experience. Such a trust is
essential to any knowledge beyond the realm of the scientific
data of experience.
As has been noticed earlier in this thesis. Professor
Pratt, in a mood of rather v^ishful thinking and with no
attempt at coherent argument, degrades the idea of a finite
God. 34 is well to call attention here again to the contrast
of the two ways of solving the problem of evil. Professor
Pratt pictures God as a God who is uninterested in man and
34 Pratt, PR, 372 and Pratt, ms, 214-15.
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who has values which are not understandable by ^rian and are
not concerned with man. The conception of the finite God
pictures God as a God who though striving successfully
against necessary odds, is primarily interested in the v;-elfare
of man and has values which are understandable by man and
concern man. Professor Pratt' s conception sacrifices the
element of goodness for the element of a11-powerfulness and
all-being. The conception of the finite God sacrifices
the elements of all-powerfulness and all-being sufficiently
to allow for goodness.
It is interesting to notice that though Professor
Pratt takes much pain to keep God's interests and values all
above the level of man, nelrertheless, in the end he says that
it would not be unreasonable to suppose that God has made
us for Himself,
For on this hypothesis the Over Soul is the source
of our spirits; and it might vrell be also, in Augustine's
phrase, "the goal of our pilgrimage, and our resting
place by the vmy." Nor Avould it be unreasonable to
suppose that He has made us for Himself, and that our
hearts are, therefore, restless till they rest in Him.
It is not entirely just a matter of preference between
the conception of the finite God and Professor Pratt's
conception. The weaknesses of Professor Pratt's hypothesis
in respect to the values of God have been pointed out. V/here
his hypothesis ends in the relativity of values and thus the
35 Pratt, PR, 383. Cf. Macintosh, PR, 54.
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relativity of the value of truth itself, the hypothesis of
the finite God not only is based upon coherence but strengthens
its own basis by making the basic human values eternal values.
Professor Pratt's conception leads to the undermining of the
coherence theory. The conception of the finite God leads to
the strengthening of this synoptic and systematic consistency
of reason.
From the practical point of view it should also be
noticed that a worship and prayer of mutual fellowship between
God and man would be impossible if Professor Pratt's hypothesis
were true. It is true that man might worship the power and
majesty of the all-powerful; but if God's interests are
above the level of man, then man could not expect response
to prayer in his own life. On the other hand, the conception
of the finite God is not only more in harmony vrith coherence
but it conceives of God as being interested in man and even
of such a nature as to be interested in his fellowship and
supplications.
The improvising God . Professor Pratt draws a musical
analogy to the support of his idea of the ever complete and
efficient purposes of God. He likens materialism and
mechanism to music being played on a pianola the record of
v/hich v^as made entirely by chance. Deism he likens to a
record being played on a pianola, the record having been
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made by a distant compossr. He compares traditional Theism
to an artist playing from an already composed and written
score of his own composition. He likens his own conception
to a composer improvising.
The Spiritual Pantheism of ir^^ hjrpothesis is more
like the composer improvisin(^. There is here no
careful working out of an arrangement long "before
planned, any more than there is a merely purposeless
and predetermined mechanical operation. All is purpose
but all is spontaneity. The new is ever entering in,
the value desired is being ever achieved. Throughout
the entire process is indeterminism and origination,
yet the whole is a unitary and self-consistent whole,
because it is the outpouring and self-expression of
a single masterly Self. 3^
professor Pratt goes on to say that even in preference
to this idea of the improvising composer, he likes the idea
of the Cosmic Dancer which the Indians called the Dance
of Shiva. This conception never has the Divine working,
but always playing. God's activity is alv/ays sport. He
does not need an instrument. He is his ovm instrument. He
is motivated entirely hy his own love of life and love of
beauty.
It has been questioned previously in this chapter
v/hether a purpose which was spontaneously and always
spontaneously efficient could really be a purpose. Let us
admit that purpose can be spontaneously efficient and still
be purposeful. The fact that purpose can be immediately
36 Pratt, PR, 376-77.
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and completely efficient does not destroy its purposefulness.
Yet even so, purposes to be purposes must have some value
to tie to. Professor Pratt apparently recognizes this. He
speaks of the value desired being ever achieved. However,
Professor Pratt becomes very confusing here. If he means
that God's values are all just his immediate desires,
he has destroyed any sense of value beyond the short lived
value of pleasure. If he means that God has a sense of
values which are eternally his values, then in this sense
at least there is an element of values transcending his own
immediate experience.
It may well be a^^reed with Professor Pratt, that God
probably has no one static goal which He is working toward;
but to say that God has no goals which transcend his
iirmediste experience is entirely another thing. To say this
latter would- indicate that God had no sense of the evil and
suffering which m.uch of humanity is going through, for no
good God could be content if he knew of this suffering unless
he vms working to improve the situation, or saw the final
outcome as an improved situation. To say that God has no
goals which transcend his immediate experience is to say
that God is entirely tied up in the satisfaction of his own
immediate pleasures. Such a self xvould be almost on the same
level as the lower animal life. If a highly developed personality
is to be attributed to Godj He must have a conception of values.
11
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God may not have a static goal in the future; but to
say that God has no goals transcending his ovm iimnediate
experience is to say that God does not think, for thought
transcends time. The meaning of the present is real only
in reference to the past and to the future. Consciousness
may exist with only the thought of the immediate present,
butihis consciousness lacks meaning and even lacks identity
without reference to the past and without expectancy of a
future. The very nature of a self is to possess an identity
which does not change with the passing of time. 37 God is
not a person imless he has developed reason and values which
transcend the immediate present.
Even though consciousness ma-y be directed very much
toward the present; v/ithout reference to values which are
lasting values or at least valuable in the future, all
values of the present become meaningless. Pleasure may
exist without thought of the future; but isolated pleasure
with no thought of value has not intelligent value significance.
Isolated pleasure must be recognized as only a temporarjr thing,
unless it be related to all the values of a whole life. A
self which follows nothing but the immediate pleasure motive
does not think, but only experiences and exists on an animal
plane of selfhood. Such a self could hardly be attributed to
God.
37 Brightman, ITP, 192. ii
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Professor Pratt does not attribute such a nature to
1
God. The picture that he paints of God is not a picture of
an animal-like existence following a pleasure motive. It is
a picture of austere beautj'" "which comes forth as the ever
fulfillin>3 of the inner urge of His own love of life and love
of beauty. If God is not a thinking being who can interpret
value, and if man can not understand God's values, havf is
anyone to know whether the inner ugges of God are the love of
life and the love of beauty. And if that life and that beauty
are not describable, how are they to be established as being
values. If we are to accept God's values as being values,
we must at least allow that he can intelligently consider
them as values by the time transcending reference of thought.
Apart from intelligence values have no significance. Apart
from intelligence the love of life and the love of beauty can
have no more significance than that of a feeling or a pleasure.
Intelligence depends upon the time transcendence of thought.
If God's thou.^hts, purposes, and activities are all in the
immediate loresent, and there is no reference possible to
anything transcending the imraediate present; then intelligence
cannot be attributed to God, and God can have no intelligent
values, but must always act on the animal plane of feeling
and pleasure. Such a conception of God is inconsistent with
the conception of the "Determiner of Destiny," or the
conception of the Cosmic Artist.
38 Pratt, PR, 372.
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In the analogy at the beginning of thivS sub-section
on the improvising God, it was stated that Professor Pratt
likened traditional Theism to an artist playing from an
already composed and written score of his own composition.
I doubt whether a personal idealist of today would accept
such an analogy as being a fair representation of his
conception of God. The conception of the finite God is quite
central^' to such an analogy. Far be it from a matter of God's
completely predetermining all of His activities. The conception
of the finite God has God facing alm.ost as much of a non-
predictable futvire as does Professor Pratt's conception of God.
God has values which He cherishes for the future, though the
future is by no means determined in any exact or specific way.
God endeavors to realize rpore and more of his ideal values, and
will in the end have greater perfection than he has now; but
by no means is each activitj?- previously plajined or pondered
over. God is a God of action, and yet he is a God v/ho holds
to unattained values and purposes. This likewise is far from,
being a static and fixed goal of the kind to which Professor
Pratt objects. T^Tor is God necessarily a thwarted, pondering,
contriving God. Yet He is a God who is facing the reality
of his ovm limitations. He limits himself to the good and to
consistent activity. He is a God who sees things in all
perspectives, and who understands all points of view, and
from this perspective of all perspectives He- knows all. 'But
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this does not mean that human knowledge is foreign to him,
or that human beings are entirely ignorant of absolute truth
and of ultimate values.
The wildness of God . Professor Pratt attributes to
the Cosmic Self a disposition of being terrifying and austere
as well as of being sweet and safe. If God is all powerful^
almighty, the originator of all, then the only way to account
for these other characteristics in the world is to attribute
them to his personality. These characteristics look evil or
terrible to us, but we may believe that if we could see them
all as they fit together in God's perspective that they are
beautiful.
If we are to take this "Spiritual Pantheism" seriously
we must go the Y/hole way with it. God is to be fovmd
not only in the svfeet and safe, but in the austere and
the terrifying as well, "The beauty of the Lord" is
not in the little alone, ^Te must be prepared to trace
it in the overwhelmingly immense, and to believe it
possible that there may be a transcendent beauty on a
scale too large, and in a complication of detail too
multiform, for our little minds, with their particular
interests and instinctive fears, to grasp or to
appreciate. If God be the V»'orld Soul there is sji
element of wildness in Him not recognized in the usual
picture of "Our Heavenly Father. "^^
This wildness of God, as attributed to Eim by Professor
Pratt, is then, not necessarily wildness in God's perspective,
but it appears as wildness to us because v;e can not see it in
its real perspective. God's real beauty and interest is not
55 Pratt, PR, 379.
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meant to be appreciated by huinan bein{^s, but by Himself,
God is more or less indifferent to hnnpr' beings, and for
that reason some of His activities appear as wild to huraanity.
It is God's indifference to can then, in Professor Pratt's
conception, that makes His values transcendent, and thus makes
Him appear to have an element of wildness in Him. The argiments
as set forth in the foregoing sub-section seem to prove that
if personality is to be attributed to God, He must have values
which are permanent and which are not entirely beyond the
appreciation of mankind. The folloiving chapter summarizes
and concludes this and the foregoing problems.

CHAPTER V
PROBLEMS SmCvIARIZED AITD COHCLUDED
I.
Throughout the foregoing chapters problems have been
!
raised. Some of these problems have been solved, others have
had to be left unsolved, and there are still other problems
which T/ere implied which likewise remain unsolved. This
chapter is divided into three sections; (l) the problems
implied, (2) the problem.s unsolved, ejad (3) the problems
solved. By problems solved it is meant solved to the
i
satisfaction of the writer of the thesis.
I. PROBLEIIS IlilPLIED
Is this Pantheism? The title of this last chapter.
Spiritual Pantheism, is the same title which Professor Pratt
prefers to use in naming his Tfeltanschau.ung. Ke refers to
this term Spiritual Pantheism throughout his last chapter in
Personal Realism. The question being raised here is whether
j
such a vrorld view which recognizes the separate reality of
j
I
selves and a dualism of mind and matter is really a pantheism.
j
Perhaps the dualism of mind and matter when conceived of as an
organic unity could be considered a pantheism: but if such
is the case much of the idea of the independent reality' of
matter or of mind must be qualified. The m.ain objection here
is that selves are v/holes and they cannot be a part of another
I•
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self. They are individual lAnits which are unique. How can
a world view which recognizes the freedom and uniqueness of
the self be called a pantheism? Pantheism is the belief that
the universe in its totality is God, If Professor Pratt
believes that htiman beings are not a part of God then his
V/eltanschauung is not a real pantheism. Even though he does
consider the universe the body of God, the term pantheism
is not the right term for designating his philosophy.
Is the idea of the imirianent God consistent with the
idea of independently real existents? Professor Pratt confesses
a strong belief in each of these conceptions. He believes
strongly that God is completely immanent in the universe,
and yet he believes equally as strongly that the universe is
an independent physical reality. He shows how the iimrianence
of God is necessan,^ to the idea of causation; but he also
endeavors to establish the idee of the reelitj^ of the
existential world. As seen from the foregoing chapters it is
agreed that the physical world is real in human experience.
It is also agreed that God is immanent in the universe. But to
say that the immanence of God in the universe does not qualify
the nature of the physical universe is to deny largely the very
arguments used to establish the conception of God and of God's
relation to the universe. Thus if it is to be agreed that God
is immanent in the universe, it seems that it must also be agreed
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that the universe is not so independently and existentially
real as a naive realism would lead one to believe. Thus it
seems that if Professor Pratt is to accept both the complete
immanence of God and the world of existents, he must qualify
exi stents as being at least partly maintained by God, if not
entirely posited and maintained by God,
Is the idea of the interaction of the mind and body
of God consistent with the conception of the all powerfulness
of God? Professor Pratt tells us that God is a Cosmic Self.
A self is a substance of the natujre of mind, but existentially
real. The physical universe is the body of God, which is also
existentially real. The physical universe is not God; it is
only his body. Professor Pratt likewise in discussing the
interaction of mind and body says that the process in the
universal whole must be similar to that in the hxanan being.
"If the doctrine of Interaction in any of its forms be true,
it would seem, that we must acknovrledge in the universe a
dualism of process, 'fe can readily see in the realm, of
human experience how mind influences m.atter and matter
influences mind. It is also conceivable that the physical
universe, God' s body, might have an effect upon the Cosmic
Self, as well as for the Cosmic Self to have affect upon its
own body. But if all-powerfulness is to be attributed to the
1 Pratt, PR, 272,
i
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Cosmic Self, it could -lot be coherently ir.aintained that the
physical universe could affect the Cosmic Self, Thus it seems
that if a complete hypothesis of interaction be carried into
the metaphysical realm it is inconsistent with the idea of
the all-powerfulness of God, for it would imply something
acting upon or influencing God. If God is all-powerful, the
physical \miverse could not cause any change in him; thus the
physical universe would have to be only a tool to be used by God
or a realm in which God could dem.onstrate his power. Or if the
process of interaction is two way between two independent realities,
mind affecting matter and matter affecting mind, then God is limited.
Is this a physical "Given"? The existence of an independent
existential world which interacts with God, if one is to be
coherent, must limit God's power. The phj^-sical could affect
God as much as God could affect the physical. Professor Pratt
in several places makes light of the conception of the finite
God. 2 He makes light of the idea of a limited God or the idea
of a "Given." It seems that if his own philosophy be carried
to its logical and coherent conclusions he must acknowledge
som.ething which would be even more debasing to him than the
conception he turns away from with disgust. If all-powerfulness
is the greatest virtue of God, then to be limited by a physical
"Given" is i:r:ore lowering than to be limited by a logical "Given",
2 Pratt, PR, 372 and Pratt, 1,'iA.S, 214-15.
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or any other kind of a "Given. " Thus it seems that it
becomes necessarj^ either to pive up the idea, of the virtue
of pov/er or the process of interaction between God and the
existential world, or to give up the whole hypothesis of
dualistic realism. One or the other must be modified.
Personal idealism offers a way out of this problem.
If God is the creator of all that is real in human experience,
if God posits and maintains the physical universe, then all
the power of the physical universe originates in Him. Thus
God would not be limited by a physical "Given." However, in
order to explain the evil in the universe it would seem.
necessarj" to consider His power somewhat limited hy some
kind of a "Given."
If God's values transcend man's values, can man trust
God? If God is not concerned v^ith human beinr^s, and has no
values regarding man, but has only values which are beautiful
and meaningful to Him, is God a kind of a God which human
beings can trust? If God is not concerned with anyone but
himself may v/e not expect almost as rruch chaos as in a world
of accident? To be sure, there is much chaos about us; but
there seems to be more order than chaos. Chaos vfould be
meaningless if there were not sufficient order in the universe
so that we could understand the significance of chaos. There
is at least sufficient order in the universe to develop
1\
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persons capable of understanding at least son.e of the
aspects of the universe. There has been sufficient consistency
of objective human experience to develop- a hvunan personality
and a human \mder standing of the world of experience.
A Cosmic Self which v/as not even conscious of other
selves, and did not value the existence of other selves would
not be sufficiently concerned over their welfare that they
either should or could trust Him. If God is not interested
in human beings and other life, the natwe of the universe
could not be any more trustworthy than the non-interest of a
machine. The facts of experience shovr sufficient consistency
of living beauty and goodness in the universe to refute the
idea that God is not interested in human welfare. Perhaps
God is disinterested in the sense that he is not interested
in special individuals more than others; but to say that he
is totally interested in affairs other than human life seems
to be contran,'^ to the facts of experience. Such a God could
not be trusted.
Furthermore, if selves have a unique characteristic
about them, wliich makes them stand out as apart and different
from, all the rest of the universe, it is only coherent to
believe that the Cosmic Self must be conscious of their
existence and even must count them of more value as a whole
than the physical universe, eventhough it be His body. So
also God must use the physical universe to fxirther the ends
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of these other selves as well as any personal values which
He might have. If the physical universe is His will, then
this is even more coherent. Unless God's personal values
are of the same nature as the highest values man knows.
His trustworthiness would be doubtful.
II. PROBLElvIS UlISOL^rED
The correspondence theory of truth; is it truth? As
with all of these unsolved problems, the main arf.uments are
given in the foregoing chapters. Here the purpose is to briefly
summarize and state the problem as it stands. It has been
acknowledged that the correspondence theory of truth states
what truth is, but it fails to mslce anjr verification of truth.
Professor Pratt claims that it needs no verification. However,
it seems necessary to have some m.ethod of testing whether the
judgment does correspond with the object. Thus it must be
verified by its coherence. Coherence includes all the various
other tests of truth, contributing in addition a unique aspect
by making a systematic and synoptic consistency the ultimate
test of all truth. As for the correspondence theory of truth
it can only be said that it is a definition of truth; it is
not a criterion of truth. Though Professor Pratt uses coherence
as a test for truth in the realm of essence, he denies that
such is necessary in the realm of existents.
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Is inatter an independent reality'-? This question has
been rather dominant throughout the thesis. It is a question
of historical standing. Though Professor Pratt holds stead-
fastly to the idea of the reality of the existential world,
it seems that many of the qualities and relationships which
he attributes to the realm of the physical imply the need
for considerable modification and qualification. The
conception of the imrnianence of God makes it necessary to
modify and qualify the meaning of the existential world.
Likewise the idea of the independent reality of the physical
world tends to come into conflict with the idea of an all-
powerful God. Many other elements have been pointed out which
make it necessary to admit that the physical world would not
be the sam.e without the immanence of God and that in this
sense at least God must be a part of the real or the continued
originator of the real. The existential world must be dependent
upon God for its existence. Yet, it must be agreed that in the
realm of experience the existential world is real. This problem
will probably always continue to be a problem as long as
realism is held as a philosophical hypothesis. It would be
foolish to try to classify it as a solve problem. However,
before realism can be accepted it must be verified. Such
verification thus far seems to be impossible. All attempts
to establish a dualistic realism have thus far led to a more
or less a priori acceptance of the hypothesis v^rithout verification.
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Is God entirely immajient in the world? Professor
Pratt not only considers the v^rorld as the body of God, hut
says thet God is entirely immanent in the world. There is
no aspect of God which transcends the physical universe. It
seems quite evident through the narr^ arguments of causation
and purpose that God must be immanent in the world. But to
say that there is no aspect of his personality which transcends
the world is quite another assertion.
Professor Pratt's conception of the complete immanence
of God is in good harmony with his idea of the spontaneity and
complete efficiency of all of God's thoughts. 3 For if all of
God's thoughts are made acts immedis.tely, then the physical
world is the complete expression of all of God's thoughts.
God v/ould have no thoughts which wore not expressed in the
universe; thus there v/ould be no transcendent aspect. But to
say that all of God's thoughts are completely efficient is to
deny to God any of the powers of reflection and reason.
Fixrthermore, purposes imply values which must have an element
of futuxity in themj thus it seems that if God is a God of
values and purposes Ee must have an element of reflection and
reason in his nature. Such an element would deny the complete
spontaneity and efficiency of all of God's thoughts, and would
demand an aspect of transcendence. This depends partly upon
3 Pratt, PR, 375.
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the nature attributed to the self. If the Cosmic Self is
the sxm. total of all His experience, then in so far as He
has experiences which transcend the phenomenal realm, so
far He is also transcendent to the phenomenal universe.
Are God's purposes entirely spontaneous ? Professor Pratt
seems to glory in the idea that God is so all-powerful that Els
mind is never bothered with anything particularily serious in
nature. God has purposes but they are so quietly achieved that
God does not even have to think about them. "All is purpose
but all is spontaneity. The nev/ is ever entering in, the
value desired is being ever achieved. jt appears that
Professor Pratt's conception of God is something like some of
our modern psychologist's conceptions of a healthy man being
the iTian who does not have anything to worry about, or who has
no serious problems to face, so that he is never thwarted by
facing serious obstacles. Perhaps the man without heavy
responsibilities, or who never thinks about a serious problem
is more carefree; but as for the value of the man, I think most
people would trust the man who had faced obstacles and overcame
them rather t}i8.n the man who had never faced a hardship in all
his life.
If Professor Pratt's conception of the spontaneous and
completely efficient purposes of God be accepted, the evidence
of the evil and chaos in the world is to derogate the m.oral
4 Pratt, PR, 377.
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nature of God, At least most idealists will agree that a
soxnewhat thwarted God is preferable to a non-moral God or
a God who has morals which are not concerned with nisji, or
ajiy of the selves which have grovra out of Him or been
developed by Him.
Are transcendent values of value to man ? If God has
no values concerninj£ man, but has values which only concern
Himself and which can only be appreciated by Himself j do
these values have any significance to man? With a God of
such values does the universe promise any more security
to man than materialism or mechanism? It seems quite evident
that if God is less conscious of human values than man is of
the values of ants, and if God is still less concerned,
human beings cannot expect much security from such a God,
With a God like this they could only fear and tremble in
his constant presence, and could not even plead for mercy.
The transcendence of God's values are implied very
definitely by Professor Pratt. Though he uses the term
very little and then mostly in speaking of transcendent
beauty^, he speaks definitely of God's having values
which human beings cannot appreciate. He also speaks
of God's having little care for human beings.^ Yet in another
^ Pratt, PR, 379.
6 Pratt, PR, 378.
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place Professor Pratt discusses the question: "Has human
life arsy purpose, and if so, -.vhat is it?"'^ Here he makes
room for the possibility of cosmic purpose in human life.
If there be anything of cosmic purpose in human life,
part of that purpose is the education and development
of the self. It may be "we are born at all adventure";
but if there be any larger significance in our lives, it
must be that Y/e human souls have value and are v/orth
perfecting, and that it is for this v^e are here.''^
Even here Professor Pratt leaves his position very
skeptically. As for his final solution of the problem,
it can only be said that he leaves it dangling between the
seeming goodness and beauty and the austere and terrifying
in the universe, Ke seems to be more doubtful than hope-
ful on the question as to whether God sees any value in man.
It seems necessary to add here that without the Cosmic Self's
concern for human beings and vrithout values which are mutually
appreciated, there is but little more hope in Professor Pratt's
conception than in TTaturalism.
Hov/ever, Professor Pratt does not seem to consistently
maintain that God is interested or is disinterested in mankind.
In places he seems to be quite skeptical; yet in other places
he seems to be much more hopeful. He finally turns the whole
question over to religion, and says that it is ^rery possible
that God may have made us for Himself.
^
"7 Pratt, PR, 351-52.
o Pratt, PR, 383.
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Is the self a substance ? Though Professor Pratt's
conception of a self's being a substance has significance,
there are various elements about it i/Thich are rather vague
and indefinable. It may be agreed that his argument for the
existence of the self is well expounded, and the personal
idealist will heartily agree that the self is a reality; but
to merely say that a self is a substance of a unique t^/pe
bearing unique qualities is not to say very much about its
nature, 9 To say that it is an existent which is non-spatial
but yet possessing qualities, describes it but little better.
It seems that it would be more consistent with Professor Pratt'
s
empirical method for him to identify it with consciousness; but
he raises several objections to this. The primarj/- objection
is that consciousness seems too fragmentary, vanishing with
sleep or unconsciousness, and even possessing states of
varying degrees of alertness in the waking hours. However,
with all of these weaknesses it seems that the idea of
consciousness comes much more nearly describing the experience
of the self than does the idea of a substance.
The nature attributed to the self has many metaphysical
implications; so it is little wonder that this too must remain
an linsolved problem. The conception of the self as a substance
gives a much better foundation for the v/hole realistic theory.
9 Pratt, PR, 301.
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III. PROBLEMS SOLVED
The writer of the thesis considers the following problems
solved to his own satisfaction. He acknowledges that to assert
these problems solved for all philosophers would be contrary to
fact and a dogmatic assumption.
Mind is a reality. Vihether or not it can be agreed
that the self is a substance, it can pretty thoroughly be
agreed that mind is a reality. To oegin with mind is presupposed
by any attempt at thought, understanding, or knowledge. Not
only is it the presupposition of all thinking, but it is very
evident in every experience. Evei^ experience has a subject.
The subject is the "I" or the "ego" which is playing a part
in all experience. To deny the reality of the self and of the
mind is to deny the reality of the denier. To say that such
an evident reality does not exist is absurd and makes any attempt
at knowledge impossible.
Epistemological dualism is essential to knowledge. In
the knowing process there ir^ust always be a subject and an
object. The subject is the thinking self; the object is the
thing thought about. Both are essential to thinking and to
knowing. The epistemological object should not be confused,
however, with the ontological object. They are not the same
thing. The epistemological object may be characteristic of the
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ontological object; but it can not be coherently proved to
be identical. Many illusory sense experiences serve as
evidence that this knowledge of the existential world is alvfays
indirect. The episternolo£;ical subject and object are distinctly
two different things.
The self is indivisible . One self can be no part of
another self. Though there is some uncertainty as to the
exact nature of the self, there is a i^enera.1 agreement among
those who recognize the reality of the self that it is unique
and indivisible. Finite selves canjiot be parts of the Cosmic
Self, nor can they become parts of other finite selves.
Selves are wholes, which can neither be divided into other
selves or become parts of other selves.
Interaction of mind and body. Mind and body must interact.
This is the only coherent explanation which really accounts for
the experience of human action and sense experiences. Other
systems fail to explain these experiences except by making
them entirely illusory. Parallelism implies a lack of hutrian
freedom, is not consistent with the facts of experience, and
thus must be discarded. Other theories make mind entirely a
product of matter. Interaction then is left as the only theory
which coherently explains the facts of experience. To the
personal realist it is the interaction of mind and matter, but
to the personal idealist it is the interaction of the mind of
the finite self with the will or mind of God,
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The Cosmic Self. If it be granted that there is evidence
of p\irpose operating in the universe which is other than human
purpose, the only coherent explanation is that there must be a
Cosmic Self. A purpose implies a purposer. Likewise cause is
inexplainable except through the interaction of mind and
matter, which inplies the reality of a Cosmic Self, These
are Professor Pratt's main argvunents. The personal idealist
would say that cause is inexplainable without a God to will
that cause. Going on with the arguraents, if one accepts the
fact that mind is a reality and that it is a reality in the
universe apart from man or other finite selves, then there
must be a Cosmic Self; for mind cannot exist by itself apart
from a self. The mind of the universe must be the mind of the
Sosmic Self. The personal idealist believes God to be the
source of e verj'-thing, and in a sense to be all the universe
except for the independent selves to whom he gave an independent
will of their ovm. God is a self; the universe is His will,
an aspect of His mind, in a sense perhaps His body.
The Cosmic Self is the origin of the finite self. It
is generally agreed Tby those v/ho believe in the reality of
the self and the Cosmic Self that the finite self must be an
outgrowth from the Cosmic Self or the creation of the Cosmic
Self. The development of the finite self has been traced hy
emergent evolution. This is the tracing of the probable sequence
Ij
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of facts. At the origin and behind that development must
be the causation of the Cosmic Zelf, Though the finite self
has its origin in the Cosmic Self, it must not be mistakenly-
taken as a part of the Cosmic Self, for it is a separate self.
The physical v/orld is related to the Cosmic Self .
Professor Pratt makes this relation of the physical universe
to God analogous to the relation of the human body to the
htonan self. He definitely speaks of the universe as the body
of God. In reference to the relationship of the two and to
the function of the physical \miverse it must be generally
agreed that there is a very similar relationship. It vrould
be altogether too crude, however, to carry this analogy to
the extreme by attempting to make it simdlar in form. The
personal realist will consider the body of God metaphysically
real matter. The personal idealist may also consider the world
in a sense the body of God, but it is not metaphysically matter.
To the personal idealist it is the will, mind, or experience
of God, made real in both His experience and in human experience.
11
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smaiARY
The first problem that anyone must solve in the
search for truth is the criterion for truth. Vfhat is truth?
How can one find the truth? IMiat are the prerequisites for
finding the truth? Eow can truth be verified?
There are two irisin sources of all knovfledge. One
is the source of sense experience and the other is the source
of reason. Philosophers have sometimes maintained that truth
can only be found through experience. Others have said that
truth can only be found through reason. Others have used
both experience and reason as a way to truth. Professor
Pratt believes that truth can be found through both exjjerience
and reason; but experience is probably the most important.
He is more of an empiricist than a rationalist.
The correspondence theory of truth is the extreme form
of empiricism. Truth is defined as the correspondence of a
judgment with its object. Professor Pratt says that in the
realm of existents no verification of this correspondence is
necessary.
The criticism of this theory is that though this is
a definition of vrhat truth is, it cannot be said to be true
until the correspondence of the judgment with the object is
verified. Professor Pratt says that it needs no verification.
He admits that truth in other realms should be subjected to
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the test of coherence, but in the realm of the experience
of the existential no such test is necessary. The truth
of the correspondence theory of truth depends entirely
upon the a priori acceptance of the independent reality of
the existential world. The realistic hypothesis and the
correspondence theory of truth are postulated on each other.
Before either can be proved true they must be subjected to
the test of coherence.
The chapter on the realistic hypothesis is divided
into three major sections: epistemological dualism, metaphysical
dualism, and the mind-body problem. These three subjects have
been grouped together in one chapter as a means of laying a
foundation for the main chapter, which follows on the subject
of spiritual pantheism.
Professor Pratt is an epistemological dualist. Knowing
involves both a subject and an object. The object is not an
ontological object, it is only an epistemological object. It
is an object in the realm of essences. It is thought content.
Knowledge is possessed. All knowing refers to a subject as
well as an object. So both a subject and object are
epistemologically real.
The problem of knowledge is not complete however, v/ith
just the postulation of the epistemological subject and object.
If the epistemological object is not the ontological object, but
only an object of the mind, an object in the realm of essences;
II
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hew C8J1 one know the ontological object? The epistemological
object and the ontolo>vical object are not the sajrie thing.
They are two different thin,,s. The epistemological object is
really just thought content: the ontological object is a
metaphysical reality according to Professor Pratt. The personal
idealist will also agree that the ontological object is other
than the epistemological object; but to him it is the will of
God. The question is bound to arise as to how one can truly
know that the epistemological object is the same or even like
the ontological object. If they are not alike, knowledge of
the existential world through the senses is impossible. If
they are alike then knowledge through the senses is possible.
Professor Pratt believes that the epistemological object
receiveds those qualities intended from the ontological object,
and that thus knowledge of the existential world is possible.
Thus though he recognizes knowledge to be indirect and
representative, he believes that it can be trusted to reveal
the true reality.
Vilhile epistemology has been concerned v/ith the problem
of knowledge, metaphysics has to do v/ith the reality of things
that compose the universe. Vliat kind of things are real?
Metaphysical dualism is the hypothesis that both Blind and
matter are real in the universe, rind and raatter are so
different in nature that many philosophers in striving to
account for the unity in the world, have endeavored to establish
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a metaphysical monism. Some have made that monism matter,
others mind, eurid still others some kind of a neutral entity.
Professor Pratt believes that all of these attempts at monism
have been atterr.pts to dodge the question of the relation of
mind and matter.
For Professor Pratt, mind is an existent as well as
matter. To be sure the conceptual world of the mind is a
viorld of essences but in the metaphysical realm the mind is
an existent. T'ind is presu"Dposed by the verj^ attem.pt at
thoup;ht, meaning, or knowledge. To deny the reality of mind
is to deny the mind of the denier. Mind is likewise presupposed
in experience. All experience presupposes a m.ind or a self.
"If, therefore, a sound epistemology shows that such things
as recognition and thought are ineaningless unless there be
a unifying subject or self, the only conclusiori that can be
drawn is that such a self does actually be...."l
Matter is likewise an existent. Professor Pratt
distinguishes between the epistemological object and the
ontological object, yet in his epistemologj^ as well as in
the correspondence theorj'^ of truth he presupposes the existential
reality of matter. For he says that though the epistemological
object and the ontological object are not the same, the former
receives the qualities intended from the latter. Thus a judgment
which corresponds with the object needs no further verification
1 Pratt, PR, 288-89.

than the experience itself. This supposedly proves the
metaphysical reality of matter, professor Pratt refers to
several experiences which show that the activities of the
material world p;o on without human beings either observing
or thinkinr about them. Likewise experiences which are
common to large numbers of people are referred to as a means
of showing how there is an objective reality to physical
things which lies outside the hujnan experience. This does
not prove that that which is objective to human experience
is either mind or matter, it just shows thet it is not human
mind. However, it might be the mind of God as the personal
idealist believes it is. But the idealist in doing so makes
the distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal which
professor Pratt refuses to recognize. Thus Professor Pratt
believes that matter must be an independent physical reality'.
However, Professor Pratt also believes in the immanence
of God, He believes the universe to be an organic whole. This
is done through the interaction of the mind and body of God,
interaction betvreen mind and matter. Now it seems that in a
sense, that if God is completely immanent in the universe and
the universe is an organic vrhole through the process of
interaction, that matter cannot be an entirely independent
reality, LCatter v/^ould not be the same matter without the
immanence of God. It seems more probable that matter would
not exist at all if God did not exist. For the forces of
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causation in the realm of matter seem to be forces which
cannot be just given forces of matter, but forces which
must have their origin in God.
On the other hand, to hold with the personal idealist
that matter is a non-reelity except in the realm of experience
makes human experience appear illusorjr to the realist. Space
is not the creation of the human luind, for spatial operations
continue in the absence of humsn minds. Thus matter must be
the creation of f^od in the realm of both His experience and
the experience of all selves. I'luch effort was made and many
pages scrapped in the attempt to find a solution of this
problem between the idealists and the realists, yet it must
be left as more or less of an unsolved problem. It might
be agfeed that personal idealism more coherently explains all
experience, but it could hardly be considered fair to the
realist to say that the problem is completely solved and close
The mind-body problem is the problem of the relation
of the mind to the body. By analyzing the bodily fxmctions
we see that it comes to be really a problem of the relation
of that which is known as m.ind or thought with the nervous
system and m.ore particularily the brain. The materialist
and behaviorist make the mind merely the product of the
fxinctioning of the brain or body. The Absolute idealist
makes it all the functioning of the Absolute. However,
between these two extremes stand both the personal realist
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and the personal idealist. These two disagree as to the
ultimate nature of the body metajihy sica lly, but they agree
that the mind and body interact. The personal idealist,
however, says that really it is the mind of the human being
interacting with the mind of God; while the personal realist
must make it an interaction between a h\Aman mind and an
existential ly real ms.tter.
The materialist doctrine regarding the relation of
the mind and body is called epiphenomena 1i sm. Mind is a
phenomenon caused by the body. Parallelism is another
hypothesis regarding the relation betv/een the mind and body,
which says that the tvro run along parallel and are timed so
that when one acts the other acts. Interaction is the theory
that each influences the other. As it has been said above
both the personal realist and the personal idealist believe
that interaction is the true hypothesis, though they disagree
as to the nature of that with which the mind interacts.
Before Professor Pratt establishes his hypothesis
of spiritual pantheism he refutes materialism, dualistic
or atheistic pluralism, deism, transcendental theism, the
conception of the finite God, and Absolute idealism.
Materialists are not consistent in their arguments.
Different materialists varj/- considerably in their approach.
Their main thesis is that matter is alv^-ays the cause of every-
thing. Purpose can never act as a cause. Mind has no influence
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on the body. The truth is however, that the facts of science
are only the discovery of a sequence of events. The materialist
can not explain cause j he only witnesses it. Everday experience
in life proves the efficiency of purpose in life. Man is more
than just physical; therefore the universe vmich produced raan
mxst be more than just physical. FiH-thermore, to deny the
reality of mind is to deny the denier.
The dualistic and atheistic pluralist s avoid materialism,
but claim that life is a very infinitesimal part of the
universe and that there is no imiversal purpose. The world
is both laatter and energy. Interaction is accepted, but
there is no universal purpose. The hypothesis becomes
scarcely a hypothesis at all; it is not even a coherent
description of the phenomenal world. Thus Professor Pratt
discards it as being unimportant.
Professor Pratt makes a great error in classifying
deism, transcendental theism., and the conception of the finite
God, all together. He is severely criticized in this thesis
for this generalization of such different hypotheses.
Professor Pratt's chief reason for not liking this group seems
to be largely his distaste for the idea that God may be the
least bit transcendent, eventhough He be partly immanent.
Professor Pratt spends no time on deism. He makes scarcely
any distinction between deism, transcendental theism, and the
conception of the finite God. His main argument against the
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conception of the finite God seems to be largely wishful
thinking. He uses no coherent argument against it, but in
fact admits that there is much to be said in favor of it
theoretically. He mainly objects to thinking of God as
struggling against odds. He uses such terms as "a god down
in the dirt"^, as n'illiam James used to call him, and other
such terms and phraseology as to degrade the idea of God'
s
being limited by anthing. He would scarcely even have God
limited by values or ideals. He would rather conceive of
God as being all powerful and free to do anthing, than to
have Him striving for something that was good, or for
greater perfection. Professor Pratt seems to recognize the
value of this hypothesis, and does not refute it as being
impossible, but leaves it as one possibility among two others:
Absolute idealism and his ovm hypothesis.
There is much about Absolute idealism which Professor
Pratt seems to like. It is that sajne idea of an organic whole
which he retains for his own hypothesis of spiritual pantheism.
He points out the ineveitable problem which will always arise
in Absolute idealism; how can finite selves be a reality if
they are a part of the infinite? Selves are not divisible;
they are v^holes. How can finite selves become parts of an
Absolute self, Hov/ can the sum of all the experience of
2 Pratt, PR, 372,
I
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human selves be God's experience? The experience of one self
cannot be the very sajne experience of another self or of God.
Thus he leaves Absolute idealism because it is inconsistent at
this point.
Professor Pratt believes that there must be a Cosmic
Self in order to have purpose in the world. Purpose can only
be made efficient through a self; purposes can not exist
unowned. The universe is an organic whole. The only
explanation for such organization is a Cosmic Self. The
Cosmic Self is more than just process for there is continual
evidence of invention and origination.
The physical world is the bod^,' of "od. Purpose can be
made causal only through some such interaction between mind
and matter as seen in the human mind-body relationship, says
Professor Pratt, Thus the physical universe serves the same
purpose to the Cosmic Self as a body and the process between
the tv^ro is interaction.
The finite self is real and a separate and free being.
Professor Pratt believes that the finite self had its origin
in the Cosmic ."elf. It grew out of the Cosmic Self something
like the development of a bud on a tree; but it is a separate
self and has a free will. The reality of this self can only
be realized by intuition. ^ The self has been identified by
the personal idealists with donsciousness; but Professor Pratt
3 Pratt, PR, 315.
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believes that it is a substance, which has qualities and is
an existent. Consciousness is only its characterization.
Professor Pratt believes that the self is not entirely
dependent upon its body and thus that there is at least
room for a fond hope of iiranortality
.
The problem of the evil in the universe is one of the
most outstanding problems of philosophy. The conception of the
finite God is one attempt to solve this problem. Professor
Pratt rejects the conception of the finite God, not because
it is incoherent, but because he disliked the implication that
God was limited. Professor Pratt believes that God must be
all powerful above all other things. Power seems to be the
highest virtue that can be attributed to God in his estimation.
If all powerfulness is attributed to God, then God must be
responsible for that which seem.s to be evil in the world.
Professor Pratt gets around this by saying that God has a
perspective v/hich gives him values vdiich human beings cannot
understand. God is not interested primarily in human values,
but has a set of values which are all his own. Thus God is
not bad when he acts in ways which appear as evil to huraan
beings, for to him it may be an act of extreme beauty. God
is not to be foujid in the good and beautiful, the sweet and
safe alone, but in the austere and terrifying as well. The
reason for this is man's lack of ability to see things
in God's perspective. To God all is good and beautiful.
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This is a sacrifice of the idea of the (;;oodness of God
and His concern for the ?!;oodness of T;.an, for the virtue of
power. If God is all powerful then he is free to improvise,
as it were, and make thing;s to suit his iiranediate desire. It
is the contention ox this thesis that a God who is interested
in the goodness and welfare of man and interested in the
perfection of the universe is to he considered more virtuous
than a God who thou';;h all powerful is usinj;; his power to the
satisfaction of his ovm desires even though it does produce
something beautiful in His perspective. It seems impossible
that God would not recognize selves which were free and
separate from Himself as being of more value and significance
than the beauties of the universe which are subject to His
own causation and alteration.
A God who is totally uninterested in man cannot be a
personal God, nor can He help build a better social order.
God might be admired, but real worship and fellov/ship with
Him would be impossible. Professor Pratt refers to Him as
the "Determiner of Destiny v/bich our religious nature demands.
It seem.s that ovir religious nature demands more that God be a
good God interested in the development of all life, than that
He be all Tpa/erfv.l and interested only in developing something
which He Himself can appreciate.
4 Pratt, PR, 572.
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